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Title:

An Historical Overview of Creativity with Implications for
Education

Dr.

v~r-Guy

This thesis traced the development of the concept of creativity
from the earliest works in the intellectual history of Western civilization to the late twentieth century.

This historical perspective on

the concept of creativity served as a backdrop to current views of the
concept and as a reference source for recurrent views of the concept
and as a reference source for recurrent and essential themes in the
progressing debates concerning this issue.
The study proceeded from the evidence of Homeric and early
philosophical work concerning the lively and real presence in the
thinking of the times of experiences of "breakthrough" creative
thought and production.

The source of inspiration as external to the
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creative person and the conflict between the rational and the irrational in creative works were documented in the early Greek period of
the literature as of central importance to the question of creativity.
The unfolding of increasingly incisive visions of the source of
creativity and of issues related to the production of creative works
were then traced through three more recent historic periods:

the

Italian Renaissance, the eighteenth century European Enlightenment,
and finally the modern period 1900-1985.
thought were of particular importance.
point of the source of inspiration.

Two dimensions of changes in
The first involved the focal

With Renaissance Neoplatonism,

the source of inspiration was retrieved from externality and located
within the creative person as pure potentiality to be actualized in
living.

This concept of the internality of creativity was increasing-

ly refined through eighteenth century Cartesian rationalism in France
and Neoplatonism in England.
The modern orientation to inspiration has proceeded in the
direction of deeper penetration into the personal experience of and
the creative process involved in creativity.

The question of ration-

ality vs irrationality, which loomed so large in ancient Greece, retreated to a secondary position in the thinking of the Renaissance
Neoplatonists and of eighteenth century critical writings.

With the

pronouncements of Kant at the end of the eighteenth century, rationality vs irrationality descended out of view as a free-standing
question or concern for modern times.

3

The modern issues that have swelled across the stage concerning
creativity have been those of tile creative personality, the question of
genius, the testing and measurement of creativity and the creative process itself.

With the intensive focus of modern sights on issues of

personality, a considerable catalogue of multiple personality traits
unique to creative persons has emerged leaving education much to absorb
and ponder.

Testing and measurement of creativity has, perhaps, suc-

ceeded in guiding some attention to capacities of creativity among students and adults, but it has, to date, failed to provide reliable and
valid instruments for measuring creativity or creative potential.
Intellectual or academic giftedness has fared much better in the testing atmosphere of modern times than has creativity which currently may
really be measurable only by a combination of intelligence, creativity,
and personality tests.

Of particular importance are recent suggestions

concerning the creative process, most significantly the central process
stages of incubation and illumination.

It may be in these areas that

the precise and distinct qualities of creativity may be isolated.
The conclusions deriving from this overview of creativity involve
three central ideas.

(1)

There has been and continues to be a confu-

sion between intellectual capacities and creative capacities, with the
latter most often being subsumed under the former.

There is a need for

an ultimate and clear discrimination between the two.

(2)

Once focal-

ized, creativity needs, if possible, to be measured and assessed.
Until a reliable creativity metric has been achieved, however, where
necessary, a combination of intelligence, creativity, and personality

4

tests should be used to identify creative students in schools, albeit
tentatively.

(3)

As all people have creative capacities to one degree

or another, it seems that a major objective of education needs to be
the encouragement of the growth and development of creativity throughout the entire academic careers of all students.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Since 1950, psychologists and educators alike have focused
unprecedented attention on the issue of creativity in both the
professional and the educational spheres of society.

While the

original interest in creativity in modern times resulted from concerns
immediately within the domains of psychology and education, the
launching of Sputnik in 1957 galvanized the American nation to the
need for greater creativity in the country as a whole, particularly in
the sciences and technology.

As a result, schools increased emphasis

on scientific and mathematics achievement and placed new emphasis on
the nurturing and development of innovative and creative talents of
students.

In the wake of the cybernetics and computer revolutions in

the last two decades, the educational emphasis has shifted toward
technology, in which innovative applications of learning are part of
the instructional expectation.
Although in the 1980s education has been vigorously redirected
toward "excellence" and achievement as assessed by grades and
standardized tests, the importance of innovative thinking and creative
problem-solving have remained tacit concerns of teachers and the
schools.

Moreover, business and industry are demanding creative
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and intellectual breakthroughs to further and continue the unprecedented developments in science and technology in the twentieth century.

It seems clear that to serve national and global interests,

increased achievement within currently known fields and established
parameters is not alone what is going to be required for human progress and world peace.

The need for technical and intellectual break-

throughs across the full spectrum of human endeavors has never been
greater.
If we must call more upon and therefore foster and encourage the
creative power of individuals, it would appear that we need a more
complete understanding of creativity and the factors involved in its
manifestation.

A cursory examination of recent writings concerning

creativity revealed a confusion about the scope and meaning of the
term suggesting that further examination of the concept was required.
Based on previous academic studies in pf1ilosophy and the arts, the
author hypothesized that creativity was enough of a unique human
characteristic that some insight may well be gained from an in-depth
examination of its treatment in the literature of the past.

Accord-

ingly, a study and review was undertaken of writers and thinkers of
antiquity, including Homer and Plato from Hellenic Greece, in order to
discern their views regarding this distinctively human trait.

Follow-

ing this review, the author attempted to trace the development of the
idea of creativity through two of the most creative eras in Western
civilization, the Italian Renaissance and the eighteenth century
European Enlightenment.

Finally, the development of the concept

through the late nineteenth century and the twentieth century to the
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present was reviewed with special focus on the emerging conceptualization of creativity since 1950.

While the sources for the review of

literature from antiquity to 1950 were generally the acknowledged
scholars in the fields of philosophy, aesthetic criticism, and
psychology, an ERIC search was conducted to identify significant
contributions to the literature since 1950.

In an effort to achieve

maximum completeness, this search traced references by 19 "descriptors" and a "free text search" across three academic levels.

Twenty-

six Boolean "operators" were used to initiate multiple "overlapping
term" searches.

The search identified 81 journal articles and 87 ERIC

documents related to this subject.

From an overview of these

materials, key works were identified and reviewed.
In this present work, the author was able to abstract representative concepts of creativity and implicit features of the creative
process as conceptualized throughout the Hestern history of civilization.

These visions of man's creativity are presented in Chapters II

and III.

This study concludes with an over-all summary, followed by

conclusions and a discussion of their implications in Chapter IV.

CHAPTER II
CREATIVITY--THE DEVELOPMENT AND EMERGENCE OF THE
MODERN PERSPECTIVE
The Ancients
For Western civilization, the essentially human capacity of
creativity came under its first systematic and problematical exploration in tl1e works of Plato (427-347 BC).

The most famous and enduring

image of great creative talent issuing to us through the centuries
from the classic Platonic Dialogues is that of the artist who is, at
once, "inspired" and "out of his mind," graced with supernatural
powers and toucl1ed with madness.

In the early dialogue, "Ion," Plato

gives his immortal romantic image of the artist or poet in the words:
" ••. the poet is a light and winged and holy thing,"l followed immediately by a gentle expression of his equally famous hesitation of
reason:
••• and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired
and is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him:
when he-ii'as---ri'"ot"a:tta1ned to this state he is ~owerless and is
unable to utter his oracles (emphasis added).
For this double-image of creative greatness, Plato did not assume credit of authorship for either himself or his teacher and main
protagonist, Socrates.

Even at the end of his momumental philosophi-
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cal work in which, along with other issues, this duple character of
creativity is carefully and severely examined, Plato assures his
reader that this double-view of the poet (or creative genius) is:
11
•••

according to the tradition that has ever prevailed among us, and
11

i s acc e pt e d of a11 men •••• 3
In fact, however, the only part of the image that appears from a
modern perspective to have a significant ancient heritage is that of
the grace of vision through divine inspiration itself, not the implication of senselessness or madness.
Plato's most immediate source from recognized antiquity was
Homer (c. 800 BC) whose revered Iliad opens with the poet's appeal to
divinity for direct inspiration--in fact, for something like immediate
divine dictation of the epic:
Sing, goddess, the anger of Peleus' son, Achilleus
and its devastation, which put pains thousandfold
upon the Achaians •••• 4
Although this prologue vrns, in Homer's time, already a formal style of
opening a grand epic, it was by no means empty form.

Throughout the

heroic tale, Homer charges divinities with his needs for inspiration,
information and insight.

A dramatic example is encountered at the

midpoint in the epic account when the tensions of military preparations have reached the breaking point and the Trojans
whirled about and stood their ground against the Achaians, and
the Argives against them pulled together their battle lines.
So the fighting grew close and they faced each other, and
foremost Agamemnon drove on, trying to fight far ahead of the
others.5
Here Homer breaks the narrative with an appeal to higher powers for
vision:
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Tell me now, you Muses who have your home on Olympus, who was
the first to come forth and stand against Agamemnon of the
very Trojans, or their renowned companions in battle.6
It is apparent through the Homeric tradition that divine inspiration was not reserved by the poet for his work alone as the privileged fount of creative verse and vision.

In The Odyssey, for

example, Homer describes the praises given by the hero, Ulysses, to
the bard, Demodocus, for his singing of "the return of the Achaeans
with all their sufferings and adventures••? so wonderfully that Ulysses
believes the bard "must have studied under the Muse, Jove's daughter,
11

and under Apollo, 8 and Ulysses entreats Demodocus:
'Now, however, change your song and tell of the wooden horse .•••
If you will sing this tale aright I will tell all the world
how magnificantly heaven has endowed you.'
The bard inspired by heaven took up the story at the
point where some Argives set fire to their tents .•.• 9
The gift of creative inspiration was not conceived to be the
gift of poets alone during this early epoch in Western civilization.
Even the philosophers prior to Plato were inclined to attribute their
philosophical insights, in fact their power of philosophical penetration, to a magical, divine tutelage or inspiration.

For example,

among the extant literary fragments of the pre-eminent Milesian
philosopher, Parmenides (515-450 BC), are the opening lines of his
poem, "On Nature," in which he described his enlightenment on a divine
journey to the "goddess" who assured him, "Thou shalt inquire into
everything. 10 And she continued (Fragment 2):
11

'Come, I will tell you--and you must accept my word when you
have heard it--the ways of inquiry which alone are to be
thought.•11

7

From there followed the dictation to Parmenides of the treatise on the
monistic philosophy of Being and the logical primacy of reason.
As illustrated in the examples of poetic and philosophic thought
predating Plato, the concept of divine inspiration was widely used to
account for intellectual insight and poetic vision with relatively
little scepticism; little else appears to have been available either
to describe or to account for sudden and powerful breakthroughs of
human thought or for transporting rhapsodic verse.

A viable tradition

of mystical inspiration as the well-spring of human creativity was
deeply irnbedded in the cultural tradition by the time Plato began his
dialogues to commemorate his great teacher, Socrates, and to explore
more systematically in writing than had yet been achieved the questions of honor, truth, social law, beauty, love, knowledge and reality.
Plato, himself an artist of the prose dialogue as well as a
powerfully creative philosopher, appeared to be early inclined toward
a rationalized acceptance of the traditional merit attributed to
divinely gifted and inspired philosophers, statesmen, and poets, although all but the philosopher were noted to be often unknowing
(theoretically and rationally) of what they spoke.12

Plato's middle

and late period dialogues, however, bring under increasingly critical
examination this non-rational concommitant of inspiration and finally
culminate in the unavoidable (for Plato's cognitive approach) divided
image of creative artists who express themselves in highly affective
but fundamentally inexplicable creations.

8

Although as Dodds suggests in The Greeks and the Irrational, the
philosopher, Democritus (494-404 BC), must probably be credited with:
having introduced into literary theory this conception of the
poet as a man set apart from common humanity by an abnormal
inner experience, and of poetry as a rey~lation apart from
reason and above reason (italics mine),
~~
Plato's systematic cognitive exploration of poetry and poets along
with reality and knowledge led him to the most consequential identification of creativity with suprarational giftedness in early Western
philosophy, and this inspite of the fact that Plato linked the
"divine" inspiration of great creativity with the severe judgement of
near madness.
From the beginning, Plato was equivocal about the merits of
inspired creative expression, as evinced in his key middle dialogue,
"Apology":
not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius
and inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who
also say many things, but do not understand the meaning of
them.14
Along with such measured assessments, however, came eulogies in praise
of poetic transports, such as:
•.• he who, having no touch of the Muses' madness in his soul,
comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the temple
by the help of art--he, I say, and his poetry are not admitted; the sane man disappears tgd is nowhere when he enters
into rivalry with the madman.
But even these praises do not preclude the coup de grace delivered to
the free poetic spirit in the greatest of Plato's middle dialogues,
"The Republic."

It is in this dialogue that the irrational element in

inspired poetic creativity is sentenced to exclusion from the state,
though with full rites of garland and myrrh.16

Reason and law must

9

prevail in the state under management by Plato's idealistic
philosophy, and here emotion and the magical powers of the arts,
including painting and music, must be carefully censored and controlled.

The arts allowed in "The Republic" and later in the State under

the organization of tr1e "Laws" were limited to those which encouraged
and exemplified order, vigor and rationality.

Form, reason and skill

took precedence over inspiration, lyricism and emotion:
.•• if you ..• allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or
lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind .•. but pleasure
and pain will be the rulers in our State.17
Although even in his last monumental dialogue, "Laws," Plato
acknowledged the elevated status of the creatively gifted and a
certain reality to abide in their inspired works:
..• for poets are a divine race and often in their strains, by
the aid of the Muses and the Graces, they attain truth,18
his convictions regarding the supremacy of ideal and logical truths
caused him to devalue the rich emotional realities tapped by the
creatively gifted and to distrust the irrational process, product and
effects of inspired creativity.

This is understandable in con-

sideration of Plato's continuous emphasis on reason and logic as the
controlling factors in the maintenance of the Republic.

The "un-

reasoned" was neither the source nor the goal of the citizens' activities envisioned by Plato in the State ruled by philosopher kings.
Ultimately, history suggests Plato's partial rapture with inspired creativity marked civilization more deeply than did his
doubts.

The powerful articulation of suprarational inspiration as the

fountainhead of superlative creativity bore over 20 centuries of
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aesthetic fruit, burgeoning most magnificently in the form of Neoplatonism in the great Quatrocento Renaissance in Italy.
The Italian Renaissance
Intoxicated with the rediscovered classical vision of man, the
fifteenth century Italian cities teemed with a vigorous urban life,
spilling over with business and trade, humanistic studies, orations on
the dignity of man, and tributes to the rich and the ruling in sculpture, fresco, oil painting and music.

Under the sway of court-

centered schools and academies, particularly the Platonic Academy in
Florence, the Christianized Neoplatonism of such works as Marsilio
Ficino's Platonic Theolo9y, together with his translations of and commentaries on Plato and Plotinusl9, imbued the invigorated citizenry
with concepts of rational man as superior to other creatures in his
power of creativity and self-governing which were conceived as nothing
less than god-like.20 As Erwin Panofsky suggests, the Neoplatonic
movement igniting in the Florentine Platonic Academy with Ficino's
philosophical leadership caught on

11

1i ke wil dfi re--a movement the

impact of which can be compared, in range and intensity, only with
that of psychoanalysis today. 11 21
Along with commentaries on and translations and interpretations
of Plato, Plotinus and later Neoplatonic writings came waves of essays, treatises, and

11

orations 11 on the

ceived in nearly miraculous aspect.

11

nature of man, 11 newly con-

Early among these was the work of

the Florentine writer, Manetti, particularly his On the Dignity and
Excellence of Man, which appeared in 1452, a decade before the estab-

11

lishment of the Platonic Academy in Florence.

Manetti dazzled the new

intelligensia and literati with the vision of man as "endowed .•. with
the qualities that he and his contemporaries valued most--beauty,
creativity and inventiveness, wisdom, wealth and power. •22 Manetti 's
1

focus concentrated especially on the works of man:
... all homes, all towns, all cities, finally all buildings of
the world which certainly are so many and of such a nature
that they ought rather to be regarded as the works of angels
than of man •••• Ours are the painting, ours the sculptures,
ours the arts, ours the sciences, ours •.. the wisdom, finally ••• all discoveries, ours are all the different kinds of
1anguages and 1iteratures. 23
11

The Neoplatonic rapture with human potency of reason, morality,
creativity and self-transcendence flamed through the consciousness of
the time and reached its apotheosis in 1486 in Pico della Mirandola's
Oration on the Dignity of Man.

In Mirandola's Oration, man was

pictured as created by God with "seeds pregnant

with~

possibili-

ties" (emphasis added)24 and fashioned to be "the free and proud
shaper of (his) own being. 11 25

In Mirandola 1 s vision, man was con-

ceived to be not only the creator of himself and his world through the
potency of his knowledge of himself and of all things in himself, but
to be, as he actualized himself in utter fullness of creation, "filled
with the Godhead ••• , no longer (himself), but the very One who made
(him). 26
11

The convictions of Ficino, Manetti, Mirandola and other Neoplatonic thinkers and writers during this superlatively creative
epoch reverberated in the lives and works of the artists--Botticelli,
da Vinci, Fracastoro, Vasari, the

11

Divine 27 Michelangelo •.• --and
11

promoted the outburst of splendor that was the Italian Renaissance.
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The shift in the conception· of creativity here at the turn of
western civilization from ancient and medieval times to modern was
two-fold.

First, and most importantly, the source of human creativity

was retrieved from the external mystical site of the Muses and deities
(with implicated problems of validation) and placed squarely within
man himself as part of his own nature, his God-given endowment of
ability.

The wellspring of the effulgent creative outpouring of the

Italian Renaissance was not an external God or touch of grace but the
divine potency within the creative artists, architects, philosophers
and writers themselves.

The transporting effects of artistic expres-

siveness which caused Plato to exclude all but highly censored and
controlled artistry from the well-ordered State, and which found
little foothold in the contemplative Christian medieval period, were
freed for a century in Italy and gifted the quatrocentro with unequalled creative achievements.

During this unparalleled epoch, creativity

was conceived as an internal capacity shared in varying degrees by
all, but amounting to "genius 28 in a few overwhelmingly gifted indi11

viduals such as Michelangelo.
The secondary shift in the conception of creativity concerns the
absence of serious hesitation before the non-rational aspects of the
creative experience or product.

The concentration in the Platonic

dialogues on questions of epistemology, ethics and political theory
led to the rejection of the irrational elements of the creative process and product.

In contrast to the tumultuous Greek fifth and

fourth century BC, the Renaissance and Quatrocento Italy enjoyed peace
and burgeoning commerce in which ambiance the revival of the great
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classics produced monumental pride and trust in human individuality
and personal development.

The Renaissance, like ancient Greece,

breached the limits of reason and sense-based knowledge in its
aesthetic excesses, as can be seen in the passage from Mirandola's
Oration quoted on page (11) above, but imagination's flights had
become a significant part of man's own divine self-transcendence
through the Neoplatonism that rationalized the Renaissance.

The

extravagances and excesses of the artist were cognized and even
categorized as

11

madness 29 during the Renaissance, but the creative
11

expressions of the greats were accepted as the

11

heights 30 of human
11

achievement and as inspirations to all.
The Eighteenth Century Enlightenment
Under profound artistic influences from the two preceding centuries the arts were a central concern of most of the thought flooding
Europe during the century (1700-1800) known as the Enlightenment.

The

prodigious outpourings of the Italian Renaissance (1400-1600) had
quelled, but their influence was still burning deep in the European
consciousness, as was the influence of the ancient classics which had
inspired the Renaissance florescence.

The period of Elizabethan Eng-

land (1533-1603) too had come to a close, but the products of its most
spectacular progeny, Shakespeare and Milton, continued to hold
cathectic power over continental and British philosophers, critics,
and artists alike through the whole of the Enlightenment.
French

Classicism,~

grand siecle

The age of

of 1600-1700, had produced the

peerless dramatists, Corneille, Moliere, and Racine, along with the
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great classic painter, Nicholas Poussin, and a stream of brilliant
critical writings.
In addition to the rich inheritances from the arts, the Enlightenment in Europe began under the influence of two major philosophical
developments which were to direct its conceptualizations concerning
creativity, talent, genius and inspiration.

In England an empirical,

scientific philosophy of experimentation had taken root by the beginning of the seventeenth century through the works of Sir Francis
Bacon.

By the last decades of that century, the scientific, observa-

tional flare had produced John Locke's empirical philosophy which
centered on a new theory of mental processes, a psychology of associationism.

At the same time, Sir Isaac Newton had begun restructur-

ing conceptions of the physical universe and had delineated a potent
two-stage scientific method beginning with observation, experiment and
induction and from there proceeding to theorizing through resulting
deduction.31

Under the Baconian influence, the intellectual orienta-

tion of the Enlightenment in England began with a singly scientific,
observational, experimental bias.

In contrast, the bias of Cartesian

rationalism ernbued the French critical work of the seventeenth century
classicism with a predilection for logical method, rule, deduction and
basic principles, and this coloration swept across the entire French
Enlightenment and dominated the critical thinking of the first half of
the English Enlightenment, as well.
Ultimately the strongest force in the eighteenth century theorizations concerning human creativity, however, came from a third
quarter:

revived Neoplatonism closely allied with Renaissance Neo-
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platonism through the philosophical dialogues and expository "letters"
of Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury.
At the outset of the Enlightenment, the conceptions of creativity, the arts, genius and the imagination that held the most sway were
those of the French Classicists, most importantly of Boileau (16361711), "the law-giver of Parnasus. 32
11

Carrying Cartesian rationalism

deep into the fields of the creative arts, Boileau and other French
Enlightenment critics held "rational knowledge" to be at the apex of
artistic experience and designated "reason, logic and mathematics" as
the methods by which to achieve knowledge and beauty in the domain of
the arts.

By purely deductive argumentation, the rationalists secured

the arts fast to knowledge through the establishment of "imitation" as
the "universal principle" of the arts and through the deduction of
"rules" which would guide the artist to perfect imitation, beauty,
truth.33
Previously, Plato's reason-oriented philosophy of the arts had
foundered, in part, on precisely the recognition of the imitative aspects of the arts.

Due to the idealistic underpinnings of Platonic

philosophy, significant reality was denied to material objects.
Reality was non-material in Plato's vision; it was only secondarily
reflected in the material world and therefore imitative arts could
only provide a reflection of a reflection of the truth.

Since, for

Plato, the highest good was in the achievement of knowledge of reality, the result was that the arts could not be saved from devaluation
in human experience.

The fact that the most affective products of

artistic creation were often conceived inspirationally and were not

16

accessible to rational explanation removed them altogether from
the status of the acceptable in human experience in Plato s view.
1

For

the Cartesian relationalists, however, the search for knowledge
through

11

reason

vrns not a search for metaphysical essences but for

11

applicable universal principles; imitation was the universal principle
of all arts and

11

rules

11

could be established through deductive reason

for the achievement of perfect imitation.
here, of course, but the

11

rules

11

Many questions were begged

devised and the works achieved were

generally so satisfying to the sentiments of the times that they
seemed to vindicate the theories.
Within the webwork of the theories, it must be noted, contradictions did emerge, but they were overcome by the sleight of hand of
hidden assumptions.

First, the experience of complete breakthroughs

and brilliant originalities challenged the notion of the highest accomplishments

1

1

being attainable through 'rules leading to perfect

imitation and beauty.

11

Although Boileau himself asserted that the

rules were universal and there was no room for license, he finessed
the implicit contradition in such poetic suggestions as the following:
It is in vain that a rash author thinks to climb Parnassus by
dint of his versifying art. If he does not feel the secret
influence of heaven, if the star which presided at his birth
did not make him a poet, then he will always remain the victim
of his me~2re genius. For him Phoebus is deaf and Pegasus
stubborn.
11

Versifying art

11

involved, of course, the very rules which were needed

to arrive at "correctness.
gift, talent, taste .•. ?

11

But something else was apparently needed:

This "something else" is only variously

named, not systematically uncovered in Boileau's or other Classicists'

17
critical works.

Clearly, this essential ingredient was acknowledged

but was not reduced to a basic universal principle.

Though the ques-

tion was approached one way and another by the writers following
Boileau, the frustratingly vague but apt French phrase, "je ne sais
quoi" ("I don't know what") served as the final descriptor for that
gift, talent, taste, special genius, as well as for the ingredient in
the work that makes it original, sublime, a breakthrough.

And, it was

the vague "star which presided at his birth," rather than rules or
capacities, that was implicitly left with the responsibility for the
highest of achievements and effects.

As Wittkower points out in his

essay, "Imitation, Eclecticism and Genius," the Renaissance "conviction that artists are born not made" was paradoxically not even
abandoned "by the most avid propagators of imitation and the rules, 35
11

the French Classicists of the eighteenth century.
Following Boileau, the critics Bouhours (1687) and Dubos (1719)
began the first significant shifts in French Classicism away from the
dominating current of pure rationalism in dealing with the processes
and products of human creativity.

In place of reason and deductive

rules, they suggested the operation of a sensitivity, or "delicatesse," as the central guide in artistic creation and appreciation.
Through this introduction of the experiential-emotional faculty, the
qualities of "exactness and correctness" required by "reason and the
rules" could be replaced by the psychologically more relevant quality
of inexactness or indistinctness, which was conceived as inspiring the
imagination of both the creator and the appreciator.

Both of these
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nevi psychological factors, "delicatesse" and indistinctness, bore
considerable aesthetic fruit.36

Of particular importance is the fact that, with the introduction
of "delicatesse, 11 the concept of a non-rational element of feeling
began to play an active and productive role, along with the rational
intellect, in the understanding of artistic creation and aesthetic
enjoyment.

After Dubos' aesthetic theory had elevated the experience

of "being moved" to the status of the motive force in all human
activity, with the experience of pleasure as its natural goal, the
element of emotion became a central feature in theories concerning
artistic creation and aesthetic appreciation.37
Creativity achieved its most important treatment in the En1 ightenment through the works of Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of

Shaftesbury (1671-1713) in England.38 As can be seen from his essays,
which were collected together in the early 1700's under the title
Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, Shaftesbury accepted
the logical part that learned technique and taste had to play in
artistic creation and appreciation; however, he rejected both the
radical rationalism of the Classicists and the empirical-psychological
approach of his countrymen.

Rather, he looked back to the Renaissance

and the ancients for touchstones.

Shaftesbury saw nature partially

with the eyes of eighteenth century science, which was issuing forth
ne\'I' visions of dynamic interactive forces in nature, and partially
with the eyes of an artist, as he himself was the author of creative
philosophical dialogues.

Beginning with the recognition of his own

spontaneous and immediate experience of both nature and art (that is,
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experience without the mediation of reason), Shaftesbury developed an
intuitional aesthetics which was rich in implications for philosophy
in the Enlightenment39 and the Romantic Age that followed.
The major breakthrough suggested by Shaftesbury's thought was
the implication from his intuitional aesthetics that creativity was
the sole technique for understanding the universe.

This conception

set rational knowledge aside as the crowning experience for man and
substituted for it intuitional understanding.

Where the rationalists

had seen universal laws as basic to nature and had identified reason
as the vehicle for gaining knowledge of those laws and hence of
nature, and where empiricists and scientists were observing, experimenting, and logically inducing general conclusions from which laws of
nature could be logically deduced, Shaftesbury saw ''nature itself in
its deeper sense (as) not the sum total of created things but the
.
crea t ive
power.... n40 Th ence,

Only the artist who constantly brings forth from within
himself worlds in miniature giving them definite shape will be
able to understand the universe as the creation of the same
forces of which he is aware in his own creative processes.41
An important implication for the conceptions developing around notions
of creativity was the assertion that
the creation of the artist is no mere product of his subjective imagination, no empty phantasm; it is an expression of
true being in the sense of an inner necessity and law.42
This participation in the universal creative process is, for
Shaftesbury, the quality and capacity of genius.

With this definitive

concept, Shaftesbury raised the idea of genius out of the previous
vague associations with techniques, products and effects or special

20

faculties of reason, sensibility, etc.

In addition, Shaftesbury also

made a clear contribution to the question of inspiration:
No poet ••. can do anything great in his own way without the
imagination or supposition of a divine presence, which may
raise him to some degree of (enthusiasm). Even the cold
Lucretius makes use of inspiration, when he writes against it
and is forced to raise an apparition ~f Nature, in a divine
form, to animate and conduct hi~ ..•. 4
In the last decades of the eighteenth century, Shaftesbury's
intuitional aesthetics, and particularly his concept of genius, were
carried into fruitful new discussions by the German Idealist, Immanuel
Kant.

In his late work, The Critique of Judgement (1790), Kant

defined genius in a decidedly Shaftesburian vein:
'Genius' is the talent (natural endowment) which gives the
rule to art. Since talent, as an innate productive faculty of
the artist, belongs itself to nature, we may put it this way:
'Genius' is the innate mental aptitug~ ( 1 ingenium 1 ) 'through
which' nature gives the rule to art.
Here, the "inborn" status of genius and its specific identification
with creative productivity are carefully articulated.

In addition,

the rationalistic "rules of art" are given secondary place to the
rules that are naturally realized in the art work of the creative
genius.
Kant's work also provides a further clarification of the concept
of inspiration in its development after the Renaissance.

Through his

exacting analysis of concepts and human experience, Kant identified
the source of the genius's ideas and originalities as internal to the
nature of genius itself.

Kant described the genius's experience of

originality in these words:
.•• where an author owes a product to his genius, he does not
himself know how the 'ideas' for it have entered his
head ..•• 45
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Where Shaftesbury before him had suggested the creative process to
involve something of a participatory correspondence between the creativity of the artistic genius and the creativity of nature itself,
Kant treated artistic genius as a more independent and specific
natural endowment which has the power to realize its own final artistic ends through means it has realized in the process of creation.
Kant's contribution here was to shift the emphasis in inspiration from
an implicit interactive harmony with truths of all of nature and the
universe to the internal natural genius of the artist alone.

Kant

treated inspiration so explicitly as within the realm of human mental
experience and as non-rational at the same time that he appeared to be
on the threshold of a conception of the "unconscious," which theories
began to be developed in the decades following his work.
The intensity of Kant's idealistic treatment of genius, inspiration, and artistic creativity allowed his work to drive home the
implication of nearly all previous theories of creativity that alluded
to inspiration as the source of creativity since ancient times--that
the creativity of genius cannot be taught or trained.

Kant went

beyond discounting the rationalist's inconsistently but frequentlyproposed thesis that creative perfection ("fine art") was attainable
by the perfected application of

11

rules

11

in such passages as:

••. we cannot learn to write in a true poetic vein, no matter
how complete all the precepts of the poetic art may be, or
however excellent its models. (Because) ..• no Homer or Wieland
can show how his ideas, so rich at once in fancy and in
thought, enter and assemble themselves in his brain, for the
good reason that he does not himself know, and so cannot teach
others.46
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In the process of carefully articulating his conception of
genius, Kant amplified the implications of the non-rational aspects of
artistic creativity by setting artistic genius apart from intellectual scientific giftedness on the basis of genius's being nonrational.

For Kant, the scientific intellectual gift could serve

human knowledge and promote progress due precisely to its rational and
communicable nature and hence it

11

could boast a ground of considerable

superiority over those who merit the honour of being called geniuses
(great artists). 11 47

It should be pointed out here that Kant actually

was comparing artistic creativity (such as Shakespeare's) and scientific giftedness (such as Sir Isaac Newton's) on unequal grounds; artistic creativity was analyzed in its process of originating and creating, its

11

issuing forth the nev1, 11 while scientific giftedness was

analyzed at a later stage in its originating process, that of formu1 ating and explicating the new insight(s) or cognition(s).

In contrast to the Renaissance, which attributed supreme value
to creativity as a uniquely human process of aesthetic production and
spiritual self-transcendence, the eighteenth century Enlightenment
introduced the more experientially-based concepts of self-fulfilling
pleasure and intuitive understanding of the universe's processes as
the purpose and goal of human creativity.

The Renaissance concept of

genius as a 11 God-like 11 gift of creativity with which one is endowed at
birth, if ever, was refined through the Enlightenment and was ultimately identified specifically with the process of artistic creation.
The process of creation was generally unexplored by Renaissance
thinkers, being conceived as a natural outpouring from the internal
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inspiration of the artist naturally endowed with the gift of creative
expression. With the Enlightenment, theories of the creative process
began to achieve some observational content as well as psychological
depth.

While inspiration continued, for the most part, to be

conceived as essentially internal in origin and inexplicable,
Enlightenment thinkers began to examine the artists' active participation in promoting excitement of the imagination and eliciting inspiration from within.

Finally, the Enlightenment began to give systematic

treatment to the role of technique and skill in the creative process,
articulating the place of the learning and practice of rules and
methods as well as of taste.

"Genius" remained beyond the reach of

instruction and teaching in eighteenth century thought, while the
highly rational and teachable sciences, which were burgeoning in their
midst, \vere ultimately elevated even beyond products of "genius," to
become the new epitome of human achievement, products of pure intel1ectua1 giftedness.
In sum, the eighteenth century Enlightenment succeeded in netting some of the past's more powerful but indefinite concepts relating
to human creativity and in bringing them into more systematic treatment and into closer contact with human experience.

The observation-

al, analytical, and psychological approaches of modern theories of
creativity began to dawn there, and the modern "problems" in the field
began to take initial form.
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The Birth of the Modern Era:

1900-1950

In the first half of the twentieth century, theories concerning
human creativity began to crystalize around several core issues distilled from the past centuries; genius, imagination, inspiration, and
the creative process were central topics of early research and
analytical studies.

The new psychological method of psychoanalysis

and the underlying theory of the unconscious had been formalized by
Sigmund Freud just prior to the turn of the twentieth century, and
that work gave new dimensions to studies of creativity.

Along with

having direct impact on notions of inspiration and processes of
creation, Freudian psychology and other psychological theories gave
rise to systematic studies of personality, which became a focal point
in ensuing creativity research.

In addition, educational interests

fomented around concepts of intelligence and creativity early in the
century, and the developing data-based research methods were applied
to the new field of educational testing which gained many adherents in
the ranks of educators and psychologists interested in creativity.
The concept of genius, which had intrigued thinkers through the
centuries, achieved its first modern treatment and defense in the 1865
landmark study, Hereditary Genius, by Sir Francis Galton.

Appearing

as it did in the wake of Charles Darwin's The Origin of Species, 1859,
Galton's focus on the hereditary factor in genius was not altogether
unprecedented; however, Galton's Introductions to the 1869 and 1892
editions of his work suggest that it was not universally wellreceived.

Some of the points made by Galton in his Introduction to
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the first edition may indicate why the public reception was not
entirely favorable.

For example, he proposed:

to show in this book that a man's natural abilities are
derived by inheritance, under exactly the same limitations as
are the form and physical features of the whole organic
world. Consequently, as it is easy ... to obtain by careful
selections a permanent breed of dogs or horses gifted with
peculiar powers of running, or of doing anything else, so it
would be quite practicable to produce a highly-gifted race of
men by judicious marriages during several generations.48
Nevertheless, the study had its impact and was followed in later
decades by similar studies; the notion of hereditary influence on
intelligence and creativity has currency in some studies even in the
closing decades of the twentieth century.
Galton's study focused centrally on 415 illustrious men and
their familial relationships to other eminent individuals through a
study of public evidence of reputation and achievement as well as of
biograhical records.

Although his study was, at base, anecdotal, Gal-

ton accomplished a prodigious feat of documentation and statistical
analysis of the historical data, developing the method which has come
to be known as "historiometry."49 The result was a work which demonstrated significant correlations between the eminent figures central
to his study and a familiar background of eminently gifted individuals.

Through his study, Galton contributed the first documenta-

tion of genius as not only possibly a hereditary trait, but as closely
associated with creativity along a wide spectrum of human endeavors.
Specifically, Galton linked genius with originality, creativity, and
productivity, and assumed that the exceptional giftedness of genius
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results almost unfailingly in reputations of eminence and culturally
recognized achievements.SO

Galton's study also provided an array of

references to specific characteristics, tastes, talents and experiences of the geniuses he researched in depth, thus providing the precursor to modern studies of talent, creativity, and giftedness based
on character or personality traits and on environmental influences.
The study of genius took a decisive turn away from the broad and
subjective connotations it had carried, from the Renaissance up
through Galton's work, primarily as a result of the development of
intelligence instruments in the early 1900s.

By 1920, the standard

form of the IQ test had been established.51 With the apparent means
of testing and measuring intellectual capacity, "genius" became identified with "high IQ" and studies began to center on the specific
ability to achieve high scores on IQ tests, most commonly the
Stanford-Binet test.
Follm-Jing Galton, in 1921

Le~-Jis

Terman began a 25-year longi-

tudinal research study of genius focusing on 1000 second to twelfth
grade school children who tested in the upper 1% of the general school
population in California on the Stanford-Binet.

Terman's study was

very broad-based, as it researched multiple aspects of influences on
and performances of these young geniuses, from prenatal conditions,
through early health, sociability, family, and education, to lifestyle and achievement in adulthood.

Carrying out this research across

such a broad spectrum and over such an extended period of time allowed
for the inclusion of many of the aspects of the subjects' lives and
leanings not directly associated with or limited to IQ.

For example,
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personality profiles of youths were gathered through testing and
gleaned from teacher and parent reports, performance and achievement
across all curricular areas were tracked, and family background and
environment were studied in depth.
Ultimately, Terman's work served to strengthen the growing
tendency in education to focus sharply on intelligence as measured by
the IQ test and to identify "genius" with exceptionally high IQ
scores.

In addition, Terman's research bore out the long-standing
11

conclusion "that superior achievement tends to run in families. 52
The breadth and balance of his study, however, brought important collateral aspects of genius and eminent achievement into modern focus.
First, such traits as extreme curiosity, independence of judgement,
unusual interests, and versatility,53 as well as a tendency to great
enthusiasm,54 were identified as typical of the highly intelligent.
The concentrated attention on "traits of genius," including psychological and behavioral traits, and on environmental influences on
genius, was particularly exemplified in the second volume of Terman's
study, The Early Mental Traits of Three Hundred Geniuses:

Volume II

of Genetic Studies of Genius, by Catherine M. Cox, 1926.
Terman's research contributed not only to the modern definition
and description of genius, but also brought to light several issues of
importance to modern education.

First, teachers' tendencies un-

wittingly to misjudge or to discount the highly gifted on the basis of
unusual behaviors and traits55 were noted and explored.

Second, coun-

tering the common myth of genius as often physically sickly and
psychologically unstable,56 Terman's work provided a profile of gifted
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individuals "slightly superior"57 to the norm physically and less
likely, over all, to experience significant mental or emotional
crises.58
Further, in Terman's work, creativity was continuously implicitly associated with genius.

Initially, the study reported typically

"very high" scores in the areas of art and literature as well as in
science for the young geniuses in addition to a family background of
eminent individuals of whom one third received their distinction for
original, creative work.

The follow-up study of the subjects noted

that, by "mid-life," this group had authored 2000 scientific and
technical papers and articles, 60 books and monographs in science as
well in the liberal arts, 33 novels and 375 short stories and plays,
60 essays and 265 articles on miscellaneous subject.

In addition, 230

patents had been granted to subjects in this study and thousands of
radio and TV scripts had been produced by them.59 The achievements of
the subjects proved to be highly creative as well as professionally
significant.
The questions and curiosity concerning the causes of genius,
particularly hereditary and environmental causes, continued after Terman's fruitful study, giving rise to a continuous flow of research in
these areas.

The central focus of identification for research on

"genius" remained, in general, the specifically quantifiable IQ
measurement of intellectual giftedness, amounting to a tautological
definition of genius which still prevails at the close of the twentieth century.

As forthcoming research on creativity was to make

clear, this dominance of emphasis on reason- and logic-centered intel-
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ligence caused a tacit disregard of creativity in the field of educati on.
Just prior to the conclusion of Terman's study, a major review
of research on questions of genius was published in 1940--Genius in
the Making, by Herbert A. Carroll.

In this work, Carroll underscored

the conclusion of Galton and Terman, still theoretical albeit
statistically demonstrated, "that genius runs in families. 60
11

Following Terman and the publication of most of his research, Carroll
was able to synopsize from that momentous study and other smaller
studies to develop the beginnings of a taxonomy for the field of study
of giftedness or genius.

Of special importance in Carroll's review is

his focus of serious and equal attention on artistic giftedness in the
context of studies of genius and IQ.61

Carroll also brings attention

to the work running parallel to research on genius and IQ concerning
creativity and its measurement, reiterating the lack of correlation
between creativity and IQ and noting the continued paucity of objective or validated tests for creativity,62 although some preliminary
tests were being researched.
Carroll's work, in the end, appeared to be a strong defense for
both the intellectually and the creatively gifted.

Although not ad-

vancing questions of the actual relationship between intelligence and
creative or artistic giftedness, Carroll emphasized an underlying
point of considerable significance concerning the environmental encumbrances to the exceptionally gifted in America:
There has developed in America, side by side with an enthusiasm for success stories, a cult of mediocrity. This is
everywhere apparent in American social and political structure
and, unfortunately, in the educational system.63
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By the late 1940s, "genius" had become synonymous with exceptional levels of abstract intelligence as measured by IQ tests and,
due to the recognized lack of correlation between intelligence test
scores and known or assumed creative capacity, the concept of "genius"
had formally lost its association with creativity.

This lack of

correlation had been noted as early as 1898 by Dearborn in his study
of the responses of Harvard students to inkblots in a test of
imaginative powers.

He found that "some of the poorest records were

made by students of the decidedly intellectual type. 64
11

In 1916,

Laura Chassell reported replication of Dearborn's results, finding
that, using her newly developed "originality tests," subjects'
"performance on the IQ tasks bore relatively little relation to
performance on the creativity tasks."65

By 1922, R.M. Simpson could

sum up the failure of the dominant psychological IQ tests to account
for creativity in human intellection in these words:
Tests devised to ascertain either native intelligence or
acquired knowledge are certainly valuable •... (However), there
are no elements in them to extract from the mind of the individual his powers of cr5ative productivity and his tendencies
toward originality •••• 6
The discontinuity between intellectual capacity as measured by IQ
tests and creative capacity continued through the first half of the
twentieth century.

As Getzels and Jackson summarized the situation:

(By 1946) the casual observation by Dearborn in 1898 had become a commonplace research finding--giftedness i n intelligence and giftedness in creativity were by no means
synonymous.67
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While creativity had lost its explicit connection with the
highly sought status of genius
11

in the first half of the twentieth

11

century, interest in filling the testing gap had produced some
preliminary originality tests.68 At the same time, serious study was
focusing on the unique processes and personalities which produce
creative works.
The process of creativity had come under increasingly close
scrutiny following Henri Poincare's presentation of his own creative
process in The Foundations of Science in 191S.

Poincare recognized

four basic stages or phases in his process, beginning with conscious
work on a hard problem, after which rest was taken. When work was
resumed, a period of fruitless endeavor would generally ensue and then
"all of a sudden the decisive idea presents itself to the mind. 69
11

Finally, after the

11

inspiration,

11

formulation and verification. 70
11

11

conscious work was resumed for
In 1926, G. Wallas' work, The Art

of Thought, presented a four-stage breakdown of the creative process very similar to Poincare's:

(1) preparation, (2) incubation, (3)

illumination, and (4) verification.71
These stages in the proposed process of creativity became the
focus of a research study in 1937 by Catherine Patrick in which she
assembled SO professional and SO non-professional artists and observed
their processes of sketching pictures. While they sketched, the subjects were encouraged to express their thoughts aloud and to answer
questions that were asked.

Patrick's study confirmed a generally

four-stage creative process similar to that outlined by Wallas to take
place in the sketching of pictures, most decisively with the profes-
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sional artists, but the stages were not followed quite so sequentially
as Wal 1as suggested. 72
The study of creativity in its dynamic process through the first
half of the twentieth century provided increased understanding of some
of the previously more mysterious aspects of creativity.

Seen from

the perspective of a somewhat sequential process where beginnings tend
to be shrouded in vagueness and imprecision and where development
leaps ahead once insight breaks through, the creative process appeared
somewhat more rational, especially as the same process seemed to apply
to both artistic and scientific enterprises.
Increasingly during this period, processes of artistic and
scientific creation were being sensed or seen to be similar.

Not only

did Poincare, a mathematician, outline a creative process naturally
followed also by artists, but in his work, Art and Experience, 1934,
the philosopher and educator, John Dewey, analyzed in detail the process of creativity in thought which occurs irrespective of its field
of application.

In brief, according to Dewey, creative insight takes

place when, through interest in a problem and a natural process of
incubation, conscious intuition, like "a flash of revelation, 11 73
brings the unknown and known into sudden harmony of recognition.
Dewey described this intuition as "neither an act of pure intellect in
apprehending truth (i.e. logically or scientifically) nor a ••• grasp by
spirit of its own images and states (i.e. artistically), 11 74 but rather
as a natural mental process of connecting the old (known) with the new
(unknown), which is operative in any field of conscious interest.
Here, inspiration or illumination received a very rational and dynamic
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description, and the still inexplicable mechanism of the flash of
creative insight was recognized as being of something of the same
nature for both scientific and artistic creation.

The difference Kant

had assumed to exist between the two processes (at different stages)
was here, at the stage of creative inception or insight, resolved,
but differences between the two creative processes on other levels
remained to be worked out.
The framework of the stages of the creative process, together
with the psychological and biographical data generated in the research
on genius, provided a vantage point from which investigators could
focus more closely than ever on the creative individual at work and in
his or her development.

The creative personality became, in the early

twentieth century, a new subject for investigation by researchers.
Such investigation could draw to itself theories and starting points
from the emerging fields of psychology and psychoanalysis as well as
draw together the tangential or

fragmenta~

information brought out in

studies of genius and in the literature on and by creative individuals
through the centuries.
The psychology of the creative personality began to take concrete form as early as 1928 with Alpert's article,

11

The Solving of

Problem Situations by Pre-School Children," in which he reported:
The arousal of insight and its consummation in a practical
solution are favored by emotional, temperamental, and mental
factors--those which in effect constitute the total personality. 75
The classic work, The Road to Xanadu, by J. L. Lowes, in which Coleridge's personality and creative process are described in some detail,
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appeared in 1930,76 and The Psychology of the Inventor, by J. Rossman,
followed in 1931,77 detailing inventors' processes and personality
traits on the basis of answers to questionnaires designed for the
study.

The psychologist, Anne Roe, began her concentration on crea-

tive personalities with research into the personalities of artists,
published in 1946, and then into scientific creative personalities,
published in 1949 and early 1950.

In her research investigation of

the distinguishing characteristics of eminent artists and scientists,
Roe's main conceptions centered on the intensely driven nature of the
whole creative personality, the whole person, in the creative process.78 Although her work was closely bound to objective research
procedures, an anecdotal and biographical quality characterizes Roe's
psychology of the creative personality as it did most of the early
work in this new area of psychological investigation.
In 1949, the creative personality became one of the focal points
of research at the newly established Institute of Personality Assessment and Research (!PAR).

IPAR was designed to follow objective and

well-structured assessment procedures to research the personal lives
and careers of highly effective people and to investigate the question
of how such people are produced in our society.79

Its derivation from

the research of the first half-century is obvious, and its specific
inclusion of creativity and creative people is understandable.
As the research on creativity at IPAR was broken into four parts
(the creative product, the creative process, the creative person, and
the creative situation), the psychology of the creative person received only a portion of the initial efforts of the Institute in
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researching creativity; however, with the use of such comprehensive
instruments as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI),
'~hich

became available in 1943, and other objective tests and pro-

cedures at the Institute, a major effort was inaugurated to research
the psychology of the creative person in depth.
Although, according to Getzels and Csikskentmihalyi, between the
years 1900 and 1950 "creativity had only a small constituency and no
market, 80 the present review does suggest that the study of creativi11

ty was gaining ground on several fronts during this period.

While

creativity was technically dislodged from its traditional position at
the center of the emotionally-toned concept of "genius,

11

it was kept

very much in view by two aspects of the new historiometric and psycho1 ogical research into

11

genius --l) a significant portion of the sub11

jects researched were illustriously creative, and 2) psychologists using the new intelligence tests became quickly sensitive to the possibility of a significant limitation of the instruments since they appeared to be

11

creativity-blind

11

and therefore substantially limited.

Further, research into genius had amassed large collections of
incidental psychological data concerning creative individuals, which
ultimately helped to fuel the new thrust of psychological investigations into the creative personality.

Finally, the question of the

creative process itself, which had been tacitly central to the concerns about creativity since ancient times began to be systematically
explored early in the twentieth century.

By mid-century, many of the

basic features of creating had been generally outlined and demystified, and relationships between scientific and artistic creativity
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began to emerge, promising much for future concepts of intelligence
and human creativity alike.

The first half of the twentieth century

was not explosive with breakthroughs in "creativity theory, 11 but the
progress in theory and application was steady and substantial.

This

period delivered many traditional concepts about creativity in revised
and clearer terms to the second half of the century, and it delivered
new methods, perspectives, instruments and subjects to enrich the
research and other investigations into creativity for the ensuing
decades.

CHAPTER I I I
CREATIVITY AND EDUCATION:

1950-1985

The researchers in the field of creativity received a powerful
spur to action in 1950 by J.P. Guilford 1 s landmark Presidential Address to the American Psychological Association:
The neglect of this subject by psychologists is appalling.
The evidences of the neglect are so obvious that I need not
give proof. But the extent of the neglect I had not realized
until recently •••• Of the approximately 121,000 titles listed
(In Psychological Abstracts
in the past 23 years, only 186
were indexed as definitely bearing on the subject of creativity •••• In other words, less than two-tenths of one percent of
the books and articles indexed in the abstracts for approximately the past quarter century bear directly on the
subject.Bl
11

11

)

The areas of creativity that had assumed central importance in
the research during the first half of the twentieth century began
increasingly to appear as the focal points of major research efforts
in articles in professional and education journals after 1950.

The

investigations since 1950 have focused most vigorously on the creative
personality or "disposition 82 and creativity tests, with significant
11

work also centering on the creative process and the role of schools in
fostering creativity.

As Thurstone predicted in 1952, "In starting

formal studies of inventive talent we may have to explore widely
before finding the clews (sic) that may eventually enable us to identify such talent at an early age. 83
11
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The Creative Personality
Personality research, following the extensive explorations by
Anne Roe and L.M. Terman in the first half of the twentieth century
and the establishment of the Institute of Personality Assessment and
Research (IPAR) in 1949, began with strong presentations of findings
accumulated by such researchers as Anne Roe, Frank Barron and Donald
W. MacKinnon.

Both eminent artists and scientists were observed,

tested, interviewed and assessed by these investigators with resulting
identification of significant personality and behavioral tendencies in
common among them.

These initial objective and in-depth visions of

creative personalities and their processes provided a rich background
against which to view the creativity-related theories of psychologists
such as Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow as well as the observations
being collected in the school setting of creative children and children's creativity.
Of particular importance in the early stages of creative personality research was the identification of the somewhat anomalous
behaviors and psychological sets quite common to the notable creative
individuals under study.

These included such characteristics as

introversion, self-assertiveness and dominance with attendant selfassuredness, unusual divergent thinking patterns, independence of
judgement, complexity of personality, humor and playfulness, nonconformity and imperviousness to social pressure, and dedication or
drivenness of personality.84 The personality characteristics of crea-
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tive individuals relate to important issues concerning the creative
person, education, and society at large.
First, as educators and psychologists have pointed out85, these
personality characteristics and the others documented as falling along
side them in the personality profiles typical of creative people are
logically necessary components of a personality which can break with
established traditions and views to see and give expression to the
entirely "novel."

The creative conceptualization must follow unusual

by-ways with concentrated attention and involvement sufficient to
resist the pressures and the temptation to "stick, after all, with the
accepted and the acceptable view."

As Carl Rogers suggested:

••• the more original the product, and the more far-reaching
its implications, the more likely it is to be judged by contemporaries as evil. The genuinely significant creation,
whether an idea, or a work of art, or a scientific discovery,
is most likely to be seen at first as erroneous, bad or foolish.86
The tendency in the research to identify and isolate the
anomalous characteristics of creative personalities has laid the
groundwork for a possible atomization of the complex psychology invalved, especially when "identification" became a dominant issue, but
the major trend in the field of psychology dealing with creativity has
::,een to emphasize the interconnectedness of these traits and "the
total personality of the originator 87 underlying these related
11

traits.

The creative individual must follow his or her own star,

unusually alone and often in the face of severe judgement, even
ostracism, in order to produce the authentically new breakthrough.
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Second, peer-pressure is a central force in the daily life of
the student from intermediate grades through college, as nearly all

graduates of educational institutions in the United States know from
personal experience.

The effects of this condition have generally

been rather readily accepted as "good socialization-training" by educators, parents and social-psychologists by and large, until recently.

The negative effects that the school-years' group pressure might

have produced have not been a very widely-recognized phenomenon, and
most adult efforts to ameliorate stress-producing peer-rejection
situations have involved either attempting to bring the group under
central teacher-control or trying to "help" the rejected student adjust himself or herself to the peer-expectations, or both.

As Tor-

ranee pointed out, "Unusual or original ideas are common targets for
peer pressure to conform, 88 and " •.. children are taught early the
11

harsh consequences of divergent behavior, even outstanding performance
in many areas of life. 89 The "socialization-training" may be heavily
11

counterproductive, it appears.

According to Crutchfield, the training

may be in self-abdication:
Conformity, involving loss of self-reliance, undermines the
person's creative powers by weakening his trust in the essential validity of his own processes of thought and imagination .•.• (It) inhibits the person's ability to sense and grasp
basic reality, and the loss of this contact with reality is
fatal to creative thinking. In short, conformity tends to
destroy creativity •••• 90
As a consequence, school is often neither an academically "totally
successful" nor personally "terribly satisfying" experience for the
highly creative person, as the research on eminently creative
individuals suggests.91
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Third, as suggested by Ziegfield in 1961, "

strong trends

toward conformity and uniformity are increasing in our culture."92
Those trends have continued to increase.

The conclusion of Toynbee in

1962, however, states a significant implication of Ziegfield's observation:

"To give a fair chance to potential creativity is a matter

of life and death for any society.,, 93
This early direction in the mid-twentieth century psychology of
creativity, focusing on the multiple, often uncommon, facets of the
creative personality and behavior, provided a solid foundation for
further, frank assessments of the creative adult which could be, to a
degree, extended to the student in school.

The field v1as already in

full stride of development when Sputnik was launched in 1957,
galvanizing all of America to the needs for more creativity in the
nation, particularly in the sciences.

Creativity began to be given

new importance in education.94
While initial tests of "creativity" were still in preliminary
and uncertain form,95 research psychologists proceeded with studies to
identify and assess the personality and behavioral correlates of
recognized creative adults.

In the educational setting, parallel ob-

servational investigations were brought to focus on school children.
Finding behavior and personality patterns among potentially creative
students similar to those of ultimately creative adults, educational
psychologists were able to give initial outlines to some of the possibilities, needs and problems facing schools with respect to creative
children.

The tentative "profile of creative students" began to

achieve form and "reputation," as it were.

The spontaneity, noncon-
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formity, independence, impulsiveness and humor of potentially creative
students were leading educators to the perception that creative students could be viewed by teachers and peers as "obnoxious, 96 and
11

"difficult to get along with, 97 and were "often not easy to toler11

ate. "98 Observations were, therefore, not surprisingly, suggesting
that "creative behaviors" were being suppressed in the classroom setting.99
At the same time, the professional and public interest in creativity and its cultivation for the nation's welfare were mounting:
1954-- Not only individual maladjustment and group tensions
but international annihilation will be the price we pay
for a lack of creativity.100
1959-- The most urgent reason (for the interest in increased
creative performance and the nature of creativity) is
that we are in a mortal struggle for the survival of
our way of life in the world.101
Razik summarized the American awakening in the late 1950's:
However creative our scientists and engineers had been previous to Sputnik, they would need to be more creative in the
future; their numbers would have to be greatly increased ••••
Research on creativity became legitimized as a properln serious concern of the military, government and industry.I 2
The studies centering on creative individuals were exciting "a
good deal of interest and curiosity"103 by the 1960's.

The following

two decades sa\'I the proliferation of "creative personal ity

11

research

and assessment by psychologists, and the application of their findings
by educators to the understanding of creative students.

As the di-

verse personality characteristics correlated with creative adults
began to be absorbed by researchers and theoreticians and applied in
educational research in the schools, the understanding of the creative
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personality deepened.

The highly noticeable and important trait of

"nonconformity," which could be difficult to distinguish from a merely
conflictive reactionary tendency, for example, was analyzed carefully
by Pepinsky;l04 and two forms of nonconformity were distinguished:
the productive and the non-productive.

The utility of this analysis

can be seen, especially when coupled with Pepinsky's suggested strategies for turning authentic but non-productive independent-mindedness
into "productive" nonconformity for the good of all.

Its utility in

the school setting can be easily assumed in light of the article by
Torrance which appeared the year before and which emphasized a crucial
implication for schools of the growing understanding of creative
ch i1 dren' s temperament and persona 1 i ty:

"The schoo 1 's job is one of

helping the highly creative child to learn to be less obnoxious without sacrificing his creativity.••105

Another example of the creative

personality's being more deeply fathomed is seen in the work of Robert
C. Wilson.

In an article in Education, 1960, Wilson drew from the

extensive research on eminent scientists to neutralize the longstanding social and educational contention that to be highly successful an individual needs to be "well-rounded."

He notes, " •.. to be a

highly productive or creative adult, one cannot be well-rounded.

One

must devote a very great amount of time to one area of interest. 11 106
In the end, "interest" must be acknowledged as the basis of "encounter" from which all genuine creativity flows, according to May.107
Another myth-dispelling point concerning high-level creativity
brought out by the personality research since 1950 was the fact that
evidence of potentially great creativity in a field of work is often
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not apparent in the creative individual's early years.

As Hudson

noted, " ... nothing of Darwin's previous development could possibly
alert us (to his outstanding talent).

It simply is not the case that

psychologists, even with the benefit of hindsight, can detect the
signs of his dormant gifts. 108 Similarly, Roe determined from her
11

study of 64 eminent scientists that such creative persons do not
necessarily decide on careers in science "just as a matter of always
following a natural talent.

(But rather, in fact,) the most important

factor in the final decision to become a scientist is the discovery
(often late in college years) of the joys of research.,, 109
As a further example of the extensive penetration of the work in
the psychology of creativity, Torrance followed leads from the recent
psychological studies and his own education-based research and concluded that the development of creative capacity was important not
simply for society's or the nation's "survival"llO but for the healthy
development of the individual's personality:

"I believe there is

little question that prolonged, enforced repression of the creative
desire may lead to actual breakdown of the personality. 111
11

dimension was added to this insight by Toynbee:

Another

'\.Jhen creative

ability is thwarted, it will not be extinguished; it is more likely to
be given an antisocial turn. 112
11

Assessment of Creativity
At the beginning of modern creative personality research, a
number of psychological testing instruments were available for objective assessment and data collection,113 such as preliminary versions
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of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), Gough's
"Adjective Check List,

11

Strong's "Vocational Interest Test,

11

the Cali-

fornia Psychological Inventory, and the classical Rorschach Psychodiagnostic and Thematic Apperception tests.114

In contrast, a few as-

sessrnent instruments for "creativity" as a special capacity or aptitude were in preliminary form, but were not yet certain or validated.115

In his Presidential Address to the APA in 1950, Guilford

summed up, at once, the paucity of instruments to measure or identify
creative ability and the long-hypothesized difference between strictly
intellectual abilities as measured by standard intelligence tests and
the creative capacities.
Tests designed to measure intelligence have fallen into certain stereotyped patterns, under the demands for objectivity
and for scoring convenience. I do not now see how some of the
creative abilities, at least, can be measured by means of anything but completion tests of some kind. To provide the
creator with the finished product, as in a multiple-choice
item, may prevent him from shm'ling precisely what we want him
to show; his own creation •••• What I am saying is that the
quest for easily objectifiable testing and scoring has
directed us away from the attempt to measure some of the most
precious qualities of individuals and hence to ignore those
qual ities.116
In other words, we must look well beyond the bound9ries of the
IQ if we are to fathom the domain of creativity.11
First suggested as early as 1922 by R.M. Simpson,118 the possible creativity-blindness of standardized intelligence tests and the
hypothesized independence of creative and intelligence (IQ) factors
encouraged the development of distinct creativity-assessment tests.
Included in Guilford's 1950 Address to the APA were suggestions for
test-tasks to measure nine factors which Guilford initially hypothesized as important in creativity:

sensitivity to problems;
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fluency; novel ideas; flexibility; and the abilities to synthesis,
analyze, reorganize or redefine, to handle complexity, and to
eval uate.119
Guilford's factors and his suggested test-tasks figured importantly in the development of the first creativity test batteries by
Torrance and his colleagues at Minnesota (1961).

Where

11

immersion

11

in

written information about recognized creative persons provided Torrance and his associates with reality-relevance guidelines, Guilford's
work provided material which could be directly adapted for use in the
initial Forms A and B of the Minnesota Tests for Creative Thinking.120
Form C (Test of Imagination) was then added, involving a "modify the
toy to be more fun" task for younger children.
By 1962, Torrance and his colleagues were aware of a need for a
broader scope of test tasks and a wider range of behavioral observations to gain a more complete view of elementary school children's
creativity.

Their battery was revised accordingly to include a

greater variety of stimuli and a larger number of the senses and to
allow for wider ranges of behavioral observations in the seven verbal
and three figural tests.121

In their revised forms, the Torrance

Tests of Creative Thinking were designed to measure a broad spectrum
of creativity-related factors, including divergent-thinking factors,
elaboration and originality, curiosity, sensitivity to problems,
complexity and communication.121
Torrance's contribution to filling the gap in creativity assessments has been considerable, if not without limitations.

Gowan and

Demos describe Torrance as "the prime developer of creativity assess-
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ment in school children, and the foremost champion of measures to
increase creativity in the classroom. 123
11

Though the Torrance Creative Thinking Tests remain the most
comprehensive creativity test battery and the most widely used in
schools, other aptitude-centered creativity tests have been developed
and used in the educational setting.
the

\~a 11

Most important among these is
1

ach and Kogan Battery (W-K) which is based on Mednick s con-

ception of the creative process as the association of ideas initially
quite remote from one another.124 The Wallach and Kogan Battery is
nearly as \vi dely used in schools as the Torrance Battery, and its contents parallel the Torrance Battery somewhat closely both in involving
verbal and visual components and in including similar subtests, such
as Alternate Uses (W-K)/Unusual Uses (Torrance) and Visual Content
Tasks (W-K)/Incomplete Figures (Torrance).
The use of the Torrance and the Wallach and Kogan batteries has
been wide enough that considerable data have been collected regarding
their possible validity and/or predictive power.

Although the authors

of each of the batteries have themselves concluded that validity and
predictive power can be asserted for their tests, uncertainties still
abound.

In 1972, Crockenberg asserted that the validity evidence for
11

both was "cl early i nconcl usi ve, 125 and there are multiple questions
challenging these tests.
As with all tests addressing "creative capacity,

the Torrance

11

Creative Thinking Tests and the Wallach and Kogan Battery aim at
measuring key aspects, if not the whole, of
by the conceptualizations of the authors.

11

creativity

11

as identified

For the Torrance Tests, the

48

central feature of creativity was envisioned to be divergent (unusual)
thinking in forming ideas or hypotheses to solve sensed or stated problems.126 Although expressed quite differently, the basic concept of
"creativity" behind the Wallach and Kogan Battery is generally
similar; the Wallach and Kogan thesis centers, as stated above, on the
association of ideas remote from one another in the normal thinking
pattern where the association is not only unusual but also appropriate
for solving the problem.127

In general, then, both the unusualness of

ideas, as measured by the rarity with which those answers are given,
and the appropriateness of ideas to the task's solution, as judged by
individual assessment, serve as the basic measurements of these two
batteries.
\~hile

it may be that divergent thinking or associational

thinking are the essential characteristics of processes of creative
functioning, it is still necessary to determine if the several factors
that are isolated and measured by the tests are the discrete elements
which may account for or predict real-life creativity.

Since these

instruments have been used primarily with school children, the question of the validity of the measurements for real-life creativity has
been somewhat distant from demonstration and this constitutes one of
the major obstacles to their being accepted as clear indices of
creativity.

Secondly, the distinctness of the factors measured from

any aptitude other than "creativity" has been difficult to demonstrate
conclusively.

Since there has been fairly wide acceptance of the

long-standing hypothesis that standard intelligence tests and achievement tests, which are used to the saturation point in education, do
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not measure aspects of creative potentia1,128 hov1ever, the utility of
separate creativity measures has been long assumed; the question in
the aptitude-testing atmosphere is only whether the currently
available creativity measurements do, in fact, measure creativity
factors, as such.
In attempting to address the question of predictive validity,
Torrance undertook a 12-year longitudinal study using his Creative
Thinking Test which, according to the author, resulted in indications
"that the performance of high school students (on the tests) is re1ated significantly to their adult creative achievement; 129 however,
11

his findings have been variously challenged.

Most significantly for

the question of the tests' predictive power is the indictment that the
"criteria" which Torrance used to assess the students' later adult
creativity are actually characteristic of any typical, well-educated
high-IQ adult.130 Further, the value of associating divergent-thinking as assessed either during school years or later with adult creativity has been challenged; for example, Mansfield and Busse concluded
that ''few divergent thinking tests show evidence of criterion-related
validity (in the case of adult professionals). 131
11

In addition, the

direct relationship between divergent-production test factors and
"creativity" has been seriously questioned, for example by Kogan and
Pankove, 1974,132 among others.
Finally, the discriminant validity of the Torrance Tests (their
demonstration of measuring discrete "creativity" factors independently
of other factors such as those in intelligence as measured by traditional intelligence tests) has been found by Torrance only above the
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IQ level of 120.133 Where the tests are independent of IQ 1 s at levels
below 120, they have shown no underlying interrelatedness among subtests which could demonstrate that one identifiable capacity (i.e.,
creativity) independent of intelligence was measured across the subtests .134
While these challenges to the validity of the Torrance Creative
Thinking Tests should seriously undermine any complete confidence in
them, they are still widely used 135 and thought to show

11

sufficient

evidence of reliability and validity 136 to be used as measures of
11

divergent-thinking.

As emphasized by Treffinger,137 Guilford,138

Kogan139 and others, however, divergent thinking is itself not synonymous with creativity; many other functions, in addition to
divergent-thinking, make their contributions, ultimately, to creativity.
The Wallach and Kogan Battery has faired rather better than the
Torrance Tests in validation studies.

At least, the W-K Battery has

been found to exhibit a high degree of relatedness across its subtests, indicating that

11

a fairly unitary phenomenon 11 is being

measured.140 The battery also appears to exhibit a greater relative
independence of the measured

11

p!1enomenon

11

from intel 1igence as as-

sessed by standard IQ measurements.141 With respect to predictive
validity, however, though a study conducted by Wallach and Wing, 1964,
appeared to suggest predictive validity for the battery,142 Feldman 1 s
review of the study found the results to be

11

inconclusive 143 due both
11

to technical problems within the multi-facted study and to the limited
range of subjects used.
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Other instruments used to measure creative potential of students
include Guilford's measures of divergent thinking144 and Getzels and
Jackson's creativity battery.145

As Crockenberg has pointed out,

however, these creativity-related instruments have much in common with
the Torrance Creative Thinking Tests and hence need not be discussed
separately here.
A test which, unlike those mentioned above, relies almost exclusively on visual stimulus items and their perception is the Physiognomic Cue Test, developed by Morris Stein,146 which can be used with
individuals of any age as it is relatively free of academic or verbal
thresholds.

As interesting as this instrument may be for assessing

creative sensibilities, it does not seem to tap any of the functions
operative in creativity beyond immediate perceptual and emotional
responses and hence is too narrowly limited for wide use.

Similarly,

the often-noted Barron-Welsh Art Scale (Revised 1959) relies heavily
on visual stimulus items and, while correlating highly and regularly
with adult creativity, does not present itself as a test of creativity
such as might be useful in public school settings.147

Further, the

widely used and researched Remote Association Test (RAT), developed by
Mednick,148 has significant limitations for use in education due
specifically to its reliance on verbal stimuli requiring a high concentration of information to be available in order for there to be
meaningful responses.

The RAT has been used extensively with adults

at IPAR and occasionally in school settings at higher grade levels
where the necessary associative clusters of concepts or words have
more likely been attained.
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In summary, then, it can be seen that education does have at its
disposal today several instruments for possible use in identifying
creative potential in students, but both predictive and discriminant
validity remain uncertain.

The assertion of Kneller in 1965 that "no

reliable tests have yet been devised to measure individual creative
qualities••l49 was reiterated and elaborated upon by Welsh in 1975:
... the search for an easily administered test of creativity
that is independent of traditional tests of intelligence has
not been successfull{ demonstrated by those working within a
cognitive framework. 50
The situation remains the same today with respect to instruments which
can reliably identify an aptitude for creativity in student processes
or behaviors.
The modern consensus is beginning to coalesce around an expanded
conceptualization of creativity as a multi-faceted capacity involving
both divergent thinking and crystalized and fluid intelligence factors, with additional contributions from a wide range of personality
factors.151 While it has long been argued that standardized intelligence tests measure only a limited range of cognitive abilities (six
to eight of the 120 abilities isolated in Guilford's Structure of the
Intellect model )152 and hence provide an incomplete picture of students' abilities, particularly omitting the "creative areas, 153 the
11

relevance of intelligence to creativity is by no means obviated.

Tor-

ranee, Getzels and Jackson and others have demonstrated that IQ levels
and creativity levels (as measured by appropriate available tests) are
not strongly correlated, particularly above the 120 IQ threshold;154
however, clearly ''a certain amount of intelligence is required for
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creativity. 155 Further, though current creativity-related instru11

ments do not give evidence of providing global measurements of creativity, they may successfully measure specific aspects of creative
capacity.156 These two types of instruments (i.e., intelligence and
11

creativity" tests) together with the personality measures, provide a

broad spectrum of tests which, in combination, could provide initial
bases for the nev-1 perspective on "creativity.

11

The Creative Process
Follo\'ling immediately in the path of the works by Wallas, Poincar~, Patrick, Dewey and others in the first half of the twentieth

century, Brewster Ghiselin's The Creative Processl57 appeared in 1952,
bringing to public attention the anecdotal writings of many of the
eminently creative geniuses of the last two centuries on the subject
of their own personal processes of creative thinking and creative production.

Ghiselin proposed a generalized theory of the creative pro-

cess following closely the outline of four stages suggested by Wallas
and Poincare before him.

Although the stages were not necessarily il-

lustrated or illuminated by each of the writers included in Ghiselin's
volume, rich source material was provided by his work.
Following the creative experiences and processes described by
Einstein, Coleridge, Poincar~ and others in Ghiselin's collection,
Mednick formulated a quite highly articulated theory of the creative
process which he defined in a somewhat summary fashion as
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•.• tl1e forming of associative elements into new combinations
which either meet specific requirements or are in so1ne way
useful. The more mutually remote the elements of the new
combination, the more creative the process or the solution.158
He suggested three methods whereby such associations could be evoked:
1) serendipity in which the associative elements are

11

evoked con-

tiguously by the contiguous environmental appearance •.• of stimuli
which elicit these elements; 159 2) similarity in which the associa11

tive elements are evoked contiguously as a result of their similarity
or the similarity of the stimuli eliciting them, and 3) mediation, in
which elements shared in common by the key associative elements may
mediate their assocation.160
In articulating this associative process, Mednick was able to
indicate, with clear implications, the place of
creative process:

11

preparation

11

in the

to wit, the accumulation of the requisite ideas or

elements to be thus

11

associated.

11

His description also accounted al-

most graphically for the incidence of multiple, though not necessarily
11

instantaneous,

associations in both fluent and flexible manners

11

without the stereotopic response pattern characteristic of the less
creative individual.

Further, Mednick 1 s careful articulation of the

associative process attained a broader psychological dimension with
his suggestion of the cognitive or personality styles ( visualizer
11

and ''verbalizer

11
)

11

revealed by the manner in which associative process-

es are elicited, which may also, as he indicated,

11

be partly respon-

sible for differential aptitude for creative work in differing
fields. 161
11

Although the

11

association of ideas

11

in creative thinking had

been formulated variously by previous authors, and constitutes only
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one portion of the entire process of conceiving, formulating and producing a creative work, Mednick's articulation of the process brought
practical demonstration and technical handling to the concepts involved.

His Remote Association Test (RAT) operationalized his thesis

in a form which could promote further research162 and contribute to
the development of modern conceptualization of the processes involved
in creative thinking.
It should be noted that such an analytical advance in association theory was proposed by Guilford in 1959 and graphically systematized in his Structure of the Intellect model in 1965.163 While Guilford's measures of divergent thinking, derived from his work with the
Aptitudes Project at the University of Southern California, provided
test tasks for many of the 120 intelligence factors in the Structure
of the Intellect model ,164 the specificity of the defined abilities
and tasks guided his conceptualizations and his methodology along factorial lines.

As a result, Guilford's work was directed quite speci-

fically toward a mechanistic concept of steps in problem-solving as
the basic prototype for creative thinking of all sorts.165

Guilford's

problem-solving mode1l66 involved the essential elements of Wallas'
four-stage creative process, which was researched and generally confirmed by Patrick between 1935 and 1955.167

Simply rendered, Guil-

ford's model of the process of problem-solving can be seen to parallel
the Wallas/Patrick four-stage model of creative thinking168 closely,
particularly considering the double content of "preparation" for
Wallas/Patrick which included both the gathering of information and
conscious cogitation aiming at solution or breakthrough.
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Guilford
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FTgure 1. Stages in Wallas/Patrick's creative process model and
Guilford's problem-solving model ,169
Guilford contributed a systematic description of the feedback loops
between steps 2, 3, and 4 and suggested a loop between COGNITION and
INPUT (omitted in the schematic above) \'lith a "filter" operation inserted bet\'leen the two to account for "recognition" of the cognition
data after its original "cognition," perhaps an unnecessary complexifaction.
be

What is cognized need not be transformed into new input to

~-cognized

and evaluated.

Patrick clearly suggested the occur-

rence of the basic feedback looping complexity in the Wallas stages as
demonstrated by the artists' and scientists' processes she studied,
which observation led her to assert that the stages were not adhered
to in the formally sequential manner implied originally by Wallas.170
Guilford's diagram also schematically represented the field of stored
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information (and experience) which underlies the thinking and productive processes, and with the graphic representation of this field gave
perhaps more content to the fundamental concept of preparation (as
basic information and experience gathering and storing) for problemsolving and creative processes than previous, disparate references to
it such as Mednick's, Wallas' and Patrick's, and even Dewey's models
and theories had done.
Guilford's paradigm, however, probably emphasized reasoning and
tightly connected logical processes unduly in his schematization of
the problem-solving process if he wished to represent the "creative"
process, in general.

Several essential features of the creative

processes of innovations were excluded in the highly rationalistic
formulation he propounded.

For example, the common experience of

becoming conscious of answers or solutions "suddenly bursting out of
no where, 11 as if by magic, and the experience of periods of rest or
complete distraction as a time-lapse often intervening between hard
1-Jork on the problem area followed by the sudden "illuminating" idea or
solution seem to be precluded by implication from the logical 11 input 11 11cognition11 cycle.

These experiences are more clearly recognized and

implicitly included in Wallas' and Patrick's four-stage concept and
are more easily accommodated by Mednick 's process of the remote
association of ideas with the methods he identified as operative in
its activation.

The cognitive framework and methodology used by

Guilford predisposed his work to a heavier reliance on logical and
systematic descriptions of operations than might be appropriate in
representing the "creative process" distinctively.

Guilford's allow-
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ance for either convergent or divergent processes as operative in the
"production" stage does not entirely solve the basically mechanistic,
"problem-solving" tenor of his model.
Wallas' four-stage concept was brought into modern perspective
in 1955 by Patrick's What Is Creative Thinking?l71 in which the author
analyzed in detail the stages which she had earlier researched and
found to be accurate descriptions of procedures followed by both
professional artists and scientists, excepting Wallas' implied strict
sequential format.172

In What Is Creative Thinking?, the stages of 1)

preparation, 2) incubation, 3) illumination, and 4) verification or
revision are described with considerable content references to both
artistic and scientific work in demonstration of one of Patrick's
basic premises -- that the creative process is basically the same in
both areas of work.

Containing as it does voluminous references to

the work of other psychologists and theoreticians, Patrick's text
appears to be a psychologist's textual version of Rosamond Harding's
An Anatomy of Inspiration, the Third Edition of \'>'hich appeared in
1948,173 and provides rich insights into the stages experienced by
creative individuals as seen through the eyes of a psychologist. With
Patrick's work, then, the creative process as a variable sequence of
stages was brought into modern focus as a both active and passive process, capacities in each stage of which underlie summative creativity
in any field.

The Wallas/Patrick four-stage model of the creative

process, with reinforcements from the similarly-based models by Poincar§ and Ghiselin174 and Dewey,175 appears to be the model most representative of the creative process experienced in the work of profes-
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sional artists and scientists.

As such, the \4allas/Patrick model is

of central importance as a reference point for modern psychological
and educational research into creativity.
A fourth theory of the creative process, quite similar in tone
to Guilford's, was proposed in 1962 by Torrance.

Torrance introduced

his conception of creativity in the form of a simple descriptive
definition of creativity as ''the process of forming hypotheses, testing hypotheses and communicating the results. 11 176

Fifteen years

later, Torrance expanded his definition and description with creativity's being seen
as the process of sensing problems or gaps in information,
forming ideas or hypotheses, testing and modifying these hypotheses, and communicating the results.177
In this latter definition, Torrance actually stated a theory of
a five-stage creative process, with the additional two initial stages
being implied by the inclusion of "information" in which problems or
gaps are sensed which leads to the formation of hypotheses.
diagra~ned,

Simply

Torrance's vision of the creative process appears to be

similar to both Guilford's and Wallas/Patrick's, with the exception of
the final stage of "communication," v1hich was not included in the
others' theories or models.

The inclusion of tr1is fifth stage allowed

Torrance's concept to advance the theory of the creative process in
the practical dimension and to fit it more aptly for educative purposes.

In fact, the recognition of the specific stage of the communi-

cation of creative production became, in Torrance's hands, a key area
in which creative students could he guided in bringing their creations
successfully and profitably to the attention of others so that their
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work might make positive contributions to their class or group rather
than problems for themselves in the form of negative peer
sanctions.178
Wallas/Patrick

Torrance

Preparation
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Figure 2. Stages in 'tJallas/Patrick 1 s creative process model,
Guilford s problem-solving model and Torrance s theory of the process
of creating.
1

1

It is important to note that, however, well-suited to the educational setting, Torrance's view of the creative process shares more
with the rational-mechanistic, basically problem-solving, model of
Guilford than it does with the psycho-experimental view of the creative individual s processes of creation as conceived by Wallas and
1
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Patrick.

In discussing his conception of the creative process in

Rewarding Creative Behavior, 1965, Torrance not only qualifies the
"hypothesis formulating" stages as one of "making guesses 11 179 (a more
"natural" and comprehensible/acceptable description, he believes), but
he describes the sub-processes (or looping processes) that naturally
occur as "investigating, asking questions, manipulating things, making
(more) guesses and the like. 11 180 vJhile somev-1hat similar to the basic
problem-solving operations described by Guilford as "search for
answers" or "seeking for new input information" with "ubiquitous"
loops into evaluation,181 Torrance's characterization of these processes and subprocesses are more distinctly suggestive of trial-anderror problem-solving operations than is even Guilford's model.
In sum, while research expanded and insights accumulated concerning the usual steps or stages involved in the creative process,
the post-Sputnik and the cybernetics and computer revolutions of the
second half century have tended to predispose conceputalization of
creativity toward problem-solving techniques and operations as in the
processes described by Guilford and Torrance.

Deriving from in-depth

conceptions of how breakthrough ideas must occur and the processes
experienced in the full deliverance of new creative works, Mednick,
and Wallas and Patrick, propounded fruitful concepts of the distinctively "creative" process, the latter of 'l'thich is based on a considerable store of evidence and descriptions from eminently creative individuals in Western civilization.
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Additional Essentials in the Process of Creativity
In addition to the widely researched personality characteristics
of creative persons, some of the distinctive features of the styles of
working shared in common by most of the manifestly creative individuals studied have been singled out by modern researchers bringing
essential aspects of the creative processes into sharper focus.

The

features most importantly noted converge around the special relationship or interaction which exists between the creative individual and
his or her work.

These features appear to be unique basic elements

essential to the fruitful process of creative work which produces the
breakthrough, the novel and useful, the "great" contribution.
First through her studies of both eminent artists and scientists, Roe observed one essential trait exhibited in common by all the
artists and scientists:

the "driven" personality,182 a "driving

absorption in their work. 183
11

In Henle s words, this characteristic
1

"absorption" is "immersion, 184 which she associated with the condi11

tion Newton described as "always thinking about it. 185 May describes
11

the absorption as "intense" and as responsible for the "encounter l86
11

which underlies, in his estimation, all genuine creative activity.
Second, in her studies of eminent scientists, Roe also observed
that the scientists shared in common "the rarity of any indication of
a drive for achievement. 187
11

This latter feature seems to be directly

related to the characteristic of involvement in creative adventure in
which the ego is suspended or in descent in importance before the
objective of the successful completion or "delivery" of the creative
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work, as implied by Pepinsky's research,188 and the theories of
May,189 Kris, 190 and others.

This feature of ego-lessness charac-

teristic of the absorption or intense involvement in creative work is
further described by Henle as a state of selflessness in which
••. the ego lends itself to the work rather than dominating the
task ••.. The main vectors of genuine thought often do not
refer to the I with its personal interests; rather they
represent the structural requirements of the given
situation.191
Norbert

·~einer,

creator of cybernetics, explained simply:

11

My ideas

are my masters. 11 192 The involvement is further characterized by Henle
as "detached devotion. 11 193
Patrick sheds a wider spectrum of light on this
through her analyses which identify an apparent

11

11

absorption 11

emotional

11

involve-

mentl94 in the often difficult, up-and-down process of bringing a
creative and wholly new work to complete form.

The emotional involve-

ment is but a testament to the depth of the typical immersion of the
creative individual in the creative process.

The "total personality"

creates, according to Barronl95
The
11

11

intrinsic 11 nature of motivations and goals in genuinely

creative 11 activities is a fourth element in the creative process, as

brought out by Crutchfield.

In his analysis of the selfless, passion-

ate, and total involvement in the process of creation, Crutchfield
identified the source of both motivation and goals in

11

genuine 11 crea-

tive endeavor as intrinsic to the creative individual and the creative
work rather than extrinsic:
... task-involvement in the creative act is not the same as the
person's seeking to achieve 'creativity' per seas his goal.
The latter is merely a form of ego-need i""ilWhTCh the person
strives to create in order to fulfill a certain
self-conception--or a conception by others--that he is a
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creative person. 1 Such deliberate strivings to be ~rgative
are not likely to be conducive to genuine creativity. 9
1

1

1

One serious implication of this analysis is the casting of doubt on
the validity of using external pressures of expectation or
to stimulate creativity.

11

absorption

11

direction

As May explains, when creativity is

service of sornething ••• else, 197 the intense
11

11

may be lacking, and

11

11

encounter

11

11

in the

or

11

this is the central feature of many

kinds of artistic exhibitionism--what Rank calls the artiste
rnanque. 198
11

GJven the above considerations of absorption, intense involvement, and the necessity of intrinsic motivation and goals, it would
seem that freedom to follow one 1 s own line of thinking, one 1 s own processes to the ends they entail, is a prerequisite for authentic creativity; and this freedom to follow one's own thinking would seem to
imply the precedence of the natural interests of the creative indivi dual, as suggested by the extensive discussions of educators and
psychologists, including Gowan and Demos,199 Bruner,200 Patrick,201
and Torrance.202
Furthermore, the high degree of individuality and independence
involved in the creative process, including the need to

11

let the mind

11

wander, 203 combine to suggest hesitations about expectations for
creativity in group contexts where group planning and group processes
have the objective of achieving extrinsic goals of producing cooperative solutions and/or products.

In fact, while there have been signi-

ficant studies of group procedures, such as brainstorming, suggesting
positive results,204 deeper analyses of both the processes and the
products involved in such procedures have led to negative assess-
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ments.205

It is interesting to note that, while Parnes advocates the

use of group brain-storming techniques to stimulate creative problemsolving, he notes, "By far the greatest percentage of time is spent in
individual ideation and judgement. 206

In their study, "Creativity

11

and Personality," Cattell and Butcher point out the predominance of
"introversion observed particularly among physical scientists" in
juxtaposition to scientific research conditions today which
is increasingly a matter of team work, and the leader, or innovator, or inventor may appear to be highly dependent on effective cooperation and even on conventional social skills.
But even in these conditions and in the field of technology
and applied research, it has been frequently pointed out •••
that the individual, fertile originator remains the crucial
factor in scientific progress; and this applies even more
strongly in th7oretical fields, perhaps especially in
mathematics.20
Cattell and Butcher go on to quote Van Zeist and Kerr's findings that
scientific and technical personnel share a "disbelief in egalitarian
'committee-like' practices in research groups and a need for withdrawal and cogitation."208 Even more doubtful about the effectiveness
of group-oriented procedures for stimulating creativity, Getzels and
Jackson note that MacKinnon's close research observations ''show that
the group process does not yield proportionately more ideas, more unique ideas, or ideas of higher quality. 209 They quote MacKinnon as
11

concluding:

"In fact, it appears that the group process i nhi bi ts

creative thinking. 210
11

The observations concerning creative individuals' responses to
group-thinking processes would appear to lend credence to the suggesti on that individual, personal interests and processes are fundamental
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to authentic creativity.

In addition, the element of the consider-

able, even strenuous mental and emotional application typically
involved in creative processes further supports the hypothesis that
personal interests are at the base of creativity.

This element of
11

diligent application, which is often exhibited to the point of

dogged

persistence, 11 211 is implied in the several stages outlined in all of
the significant models of the creative process described previously.
The initial

11

preparation (and cogitation) 11

11

(

input 11 or

11

infor-

mation gathering 11 ) stage of this process requires that keen attention
be applied in order for data to be accumulated and cogitated in their
full complexity.

Patrick described the preparation and cogitation

stage repeatedly as

11

long and hard work, 11 212 often defeatingly so.213

As Dewey maintained, inventions, solutions, discoveries rarely occur
"except to a mind that has previously steeped itself consciously in
material related to its question, 11 (emphasis added)214 and Helmholtz's
account of his creative process pointed out the concentrated effort
involved in the cogitation that is a part of the preparation phase of
creative work:
It is always requisite (for a discovery to emerge) that I
should have turned my problem over on all sides, hither and
thither, to the point where I could see all its terms and
complexities in my head and could run through them without
writing. To bring matters to this point is usually impossible
1~ithout long preparatory labor.215
The diligent, absorbed work of "preparation-and-cogitation" ( 11 input 11
or

11

information 11 ) , is actually, as implied by Bruner, akin to

11

prac-

tice, practice, practice, 11 216 for which continuous self-application is
required.
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This level of concentrated work is needed not only in the
initial preparation-cogitation stage (or the input, information stage
followed by cognition) but, after the breakthrough or solution is
achieved, in the final stage of "verification" ("testing," "evaluation," or "revision").

According to Patrick, "The final stage of

revision or verification .•• is typically unpleasant and involves pro1 onged hard work. 11 217

Further, Patrick notes:

"Many persons become

so discouraged in this final stage that they either abandon the whole
project or else produce a second rate product. 218
11

Considering the effort that must be expended in absorption with
the genuinely creative work, it would seem that, especially for the
youthful, potentially creative individual, sufficient personal
involvement would most naturally derive from personal curiosity,
intrigue and interest; thus, the freedom required for creative activity would imply an allowance for even the young creator to follow personal bents and fascinations.219
Inspiration Through Modern Eyes
In the treatments of creativity through the 25 centuries preceding the present, illumination or inspiration in the process of creativity was generally accepted as evidence of special, even divine,
giftedness but it was otherwise little analyzed.

With the works of

Poincare, Wallas and others early in the present century and with the
popularization of the concepts involved in the creative process by
Ghiselin's work in 1945, the place and character of inspiration in the
creative experience began to be demarked and described in some
detail.

A full accounting has not as yet, however, been delivered.
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As represented in the modern Wa11 as/Patrick creativity model
(Fig. 2), the central creative stage of "inspiration" or "illumination" is generally directly preceded by a period or phase of "incubation'' in which the creator takes a rest from the absorbing work in
which he or she has been engaged.

This latter stage is described and

psychologically analyzed by Patrick:
After continuous work on a problem many inhibitions and interferences are set up. Relaxation allows these to die out, and
permits a fresh approach to be made. When an inspiration
comes in the midst of conversation or during other unrelated
work, it is probable that some unnoticed stimulus has provoked
a return to the original problem, which is solved immediatel~
because of the absence of the old conflicts and confusions.2 0
Here, Patrick seems to be drawing implicitly on "association" to account for the spontaneous return to the previous subject of creative
absorption and to be relying on some assumed giveness of "solution" or
breakthrough which is immediately seen when the system is refreshed
and confusions have faded away.

Although Patrick's explanation of the

spontaneous shift of attention seems apt, the assumption of the absence of disturbing elements and the consequent immediacy of insight
does not seem sufficient; however, the suggestion of an interim connecting condition allows for the promise of deeper conceptual penetration into the creative process than previous views seem to offer.
In some of the nineteenth and early twentieth century discussions by creative individuals, a subtle progression of linkages
between unconcerted "incubation" and sudden "inspiration" was variously irnplied--for example, Poincare suggested that ''delicate intuitions"
at the subliminal level are operative in "incubation" in his
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experience and led directly to the ultimate "illumination."

His des-

cription of these intuitions is highly suggestive:
The subliminal self is in no way inferior to the conscious
self; it is not purely automatic; it is capable of discernment; it has tact, delicacy; it knows how to choose, to
divine ...• It knows better how to divine than the conscious
self, since it succeeds where that has failed.221
Poincare described in more detail this "choosing" or "divining":
•.• the word (to choose) is perhaps not wholly exact. It makes
one think of a purchaser before whom are displayed a large
number of samples, and who examines them, one after the other,
to make a choice. Here the samples would be so numerous that
a whole lifetime would not suffice to examine them. This is
not the actual state of things. The sterile combinations do
not even present themselves to the mind of the inventor.
Never in the field of his consciousness do combinations appear
that are not really useful, except some he rejects but which
have to some extent the characteristics of useful combinations. All goes on as if the inventor were an examiner for
the second degree who would only have to question the candidates who had passed a previous examination.222
As promising as this description is, Poincar~ did not attempt to account, in any systematic way, for the existence of the combinations
among which intuition chooses; they appear to be simply assumed
"givens."

In a way foreshadowing Patrick's analysis, Poincar~ seems

to have assumed somehow that breakthrough solutions exist prior to
their conscious recognition, which view has been implied throughout
the long history of philosophical and critical analysis of creativity.

His vision included, however, the operation of subliminal ''deli-

cate intuition'' which presumably would link consciousness with the
preconscious state of things (or events) in the "incubation" stage.
Apparently, in the preconscious "incubation" stage, data is interconnected to different degrees of completeness, as it were; and intui-
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tion, somehow tuned to "sufficient completeness for solution," divines
those "sufficient" combinations of data and therewith experiences "illumination."
Poincare 1 s creative "subliminal self," of which he was obviously
aware operating within himself, seems to have been advanced little toward the clarification of its implied operation as a subtle level of
c ogni t i on or c on s c i ous ne s s i n " i nc ubat i on " and " i 11 um i nat i on

by

11

modern psychological work in the field of creativity until Arieti 1 s
work, Creativity:

The Magic Synthesis, in 1976.

In this text, Arieti

introduced a new concept of a "preconscious to subtly-conscious" process which he termed "amorphous cognition. 223 This cognition has as
11

its object the "endocept" which is a "primitive organization of past
experiences, perceptions, memory traces, and images of things and
movements. 224
11

According to Arieti, the endocept is not "easily

recognizable 225 but can be "felt" by some "as an atmosphere, an in11

tuition, a

1

global

parts .... 226
11

1

experience that cannot be divided into

Arieti postulated that "intuitional knovlledge,

11

which

has often been linked to creativity, may be "endoceptual knowledge."227 Further, as "a large part of our conceptual life tends to
fuse with an endoceptual counterpart, or to transmute into endoceptual
forms ••• , 228
11

Arieti went on to posit that this conceptual-

endoceptual fusing or transmuting is a part of the "cognitive activity
11

that eventually unfolds into the creative process. 229
Arieti 1 s conception of amorphous, endoceptual cognition seems to
account more systematically than previous theories for both intuitive
experiences in the creative process and the apparent prior existence
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or

11

given-ness 11 of the breakthrough ideas or solutions suddenly

cognized in "illumination."

In addition, Arieti offered a synoptic

view of the creative individual's shifting of levels of cognition,
which occurs in any of the several stages of the creative processes
implied by Poincar~ and others:
(the creative person) has seen (or "felt") a defect, or
incompleteness, in the usual order of concepts, or has some
other motive for dissatisfaction with it. Thus he brings part
of his mental activity back to the stage of amorphous cognition, to that great melting pot when suspense and indeterminacy reign, where simultaneity fuses with sequential time
and unsuspected transmutations occur.230
Arieti's concept of amorphous cognition appears, most essentially, descriptive of the subtly-conscious or subliminal processes in
"incubation" which can be further described as comprising "an indeterminate activity in search of a form, a groping for some definite
structure. 231
11

This description appears to fit well, for example,

with the characteristic experience of incubation in which the creative
individual is somehow subconsciously preoccupied while he or she is
about other activities.

Arieti indicated that from "incubation"

amorphous cognition itself leads directly to "illumination" (though he
suggested that this is only one of many possible linkages):

'~hen

a

suitable form is found, this activity is transformed into a creative
work, at a more or less advanced stage of production''232
With Arieti, then, we find a very modern psychological description of "incubation" and "inspiration."

In both of these stages of

the creative process, the sources of the content and the conscious
operations themselves are within the individual as stored primitive or
unrefined trace patterns of experiences of all kinds, together with
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natural neurophysiological processes.

"Inspiration" appears to be on

the threshold of becoming recognized as a potentially conscious, albeit subtly-conscious, process.
Genius in the Age of Testing
After the mid-point in the twentieth century, the question of
"genius" did not preoccupy a significant number of researchers.

Ac-

cording to Gowan and Demos in 1964, " ••• the word genius has gone out
of fashion •••• "233 Further, they suggest,
••• this is a natural and a hopeful development in a new
science for it means we are beginning to disregard the spectacular and root our theory in the more useful study of larger
groups."234
The "larger groups" are identified and made available for research,
today, by intelligence tests.
Although intelligence testing may have had the potential of
obviating undue emphasis on the exceptionally or spectacularly talented or intellectually-gifted student as demonstrated by performance and
obvious superiority of gifts, it may have done so in counterproductive
ways.

First, with the IQ metric available, and following the studies

in the early part of the century, the category "genius" did not vanish
from use altogether but was rather installed as the generic term,
along with "gifted," for individuals with high !Q's (over 150 on the
Stanford-Binet scale) with a considerable narrowing of the term's
meaning.

As Thurstone noted in 1952,

••• the Quiz Kids are often referred to as geniuses. They
would undoubtedly score high in memory functions, including
incidental memory and rote memory. But it is doubtful whether
they are also fluent in producing original ideas.235
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Genius and creativity were technically and decisively separated when
studies by Getzels and Jackson236 and Torrance237 established that the
IQ level of 120 was the threshold beyond which intelligence and creativity appear to be entirely independent.

The implications of this

were spelled out by Torrance:
••• identifying as gifted those students who score in the upper
20 percent of an intelligence test [about IQ 120 for Torrance]
is to disregard 70 percent of the most creative, as similarly
identified by a creativity test.238
Second, the accessibility to teachers and educators in general
of IQ scores magnified the importance of the narrow range of student
capabilities measured by the intelligence tests and simultaneously
diminished the importance of creative abilities.

The results may be

decided inequities in educational opportunities,239 an inequality perhaps more generalized and extreme than the one the IQ metric was purported to be able to correct.
Genius has, since its origin as a concept, been identified with
superlative human capacities, and particularly superlative creativity
in the arts and sciences.

Further, the modern consensus appears to be

that "the abilities involved in being creative are universal, i.e.,
everybody possesses these abilities to some degree •••• "240 For these
reasons it would seem exceptional that the current definition of
genius should so clearly omit creativity.

The exclusion from the

classification of "genius" of those without superior giftedness in the
highly circumscribed area of ''intelligence" as assessed by modern
intelligence or IQ tests, however, appears to be a result of circumstances involved in testing and measurement in this modern age.
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In the field of testing, which has won much confidence in the
twentieth century, the testing of intelligence has proved itself to be
much more dependable and useful than the testing of creativity.

IQ

tests measure abilities which can be definitively assessed by single
established-right-answer methods, lending the credibility of validity
and reliability to the instruments.

Further, predictive power for IQ

tests is also insured by the fact that the test instruments subject
test-takers to school-related methods and measures in order to predict
future success in a school or professional setting where tasks and
objectives are based on the same fundamentally convergent-thinking and
information-retrieval methods as the testing instrument itself.
In contrast to these advantages, the test instruments used to
measure creativity which have been developed to date are comparatively
weak in validity, reliability and predictive power.

Not only are as-

sessments still highly subjective and variable, but the capacities
tested are in no way identical with ultimate manifest creativity.
First, aspects of creativity are so divergent in character as to be
almost impossible to anticipate or adequately judge.

Even when crea-

tive individuals are in the ultimate position of performing creative
work, " ••. society has often failed to recognize creative products
until a generation or two after the persons who created them have
lived. 241
11

And further, as Fabun noted in 1970, "At the time of their

introduction, most original ideas have met with ridicule, disapproval,
opposition, or downright persecution. 242
11

Second, the processes involved in creativity appear to be too
subtle to be, as yet, accessible to direct measurement or assessment,
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so only various somewhat artificial productions or superficial
process-identifiers are available currently for use as test items
which are, by definition, not indices of genuine creativity.

It would

appear, therefore, that tests to measure genuine creativity as yet
fall short of the mark.

•

CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Summary
In order to obtain an in-depth vision of the 11 mysterious 11 human
experience of intellectual breakthroughs and creativity, this study
has examined the conceptions of creativity dominant in four highly innovative periods in Western civilization:

ancient Greece, the Italian

Renaissance, the Age of Enlightenment in Europe and the twentieth
century.
From the earliest literary records of Western civilization,
there has been evidence of man's sensitivity to the mysterious experience of his own creativity.

Nearly 3000 years ago, the extraordinary

Homer repeatedly attributed his inspirations in the creation of both
The Iliad and The Odyssey to the gods and muses.

The earliest Greek

philosophers represented their treatises as being nearly direct dictations from spiritual sources.

By the time of Plato, the assumption

that creative motivation and direction issued immediately from suprarational sources had been a long-standing tradition as well as a part
of the very fabric of philosophical, poetic and dramatic form.

Plato

recognized the evocative power of many such inspired works but, as
sensitive as he was to the gifted and the gifts, he could not accept
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the inexplicable, hence non-rational, offerings of inspired verse and
drama either as "truth's" or as experiences appropriate for personal
development and good citizenship.

For Plato, in fact, this very

combination of emotional power and non-rationality constituted the
danger for the public of the "free" creative works of men.

For the

sake of stability and the strength of the republic, Plato had to
exclude from the state all gifted producers of inspired non-rational
experiences.

Rule and moderation, not excesses of pleasure and emo-

tion, were proper goals for the ideal citizenry of the republic.
In spite of Plato's harsh injunction against inspired works,
however, creative philosophical and other literary works continued to
be produced in ancient Greece, beyond the precincts of Plato's dreamed of Republic or State; and the creative individuals continued to attribute the sudden and surprising influxes of insight and inspiration
in their conscious experiences to the obvious source--not, themselves,
but some external power above and beyond them in knowledge and potency.
By the fifteenth century, events had combined to elicit unrivalled creative energy, production and accomplishment from the supremely
gifted in Italy's city-states.

Oil and fresco painting, sculpture,

poetry, philosophy, criticism and drama all flourished in the intense
reflection of light and life emitted from the discovered remnants of
Rome's great past.

The Italian Renaissance cast its spell of crea-

tivity over centuries to come.

At the center of the emanations was a

Christianized Neoplatonism in which man was reconceived as endowed
from birth with natural creative powers which only needed to be

78
unfolded through active creative, productive endeavor.

The site of

mysterious creative illuminations or inspirations was, for creative
individuals in the Renaissance, localized "within" the creative individual, and those most richly endowned with "genius" were esteemed as
no less than God-like or divine.
As the Renaissance cities of Italy continued for two centuries
to build and flourish in the currents of rebirth, creativity was
installed at the zenith of human experience and promise. With the
source of creative inspiration and insight having been identified as,
in varying degrees, within every man's own nature (ultimately, it was
thought, elevating him to become the very creator of himself), man's
gifts, no matter how exceptional or extreme, were conceived as selftranscending and full of excellence.

Through the Neoplatonism of the

Renaissance, the fact that inspiration remained wholly inexplicable in
anything but non-rational, spiritual terms caused no hesitations of
reason and the fact that "genius" was observed to be somewhat touched
with the unreasonable, with madness, itself caused no hesitation in
analysis or act.

The splendor of creative power ruled the times and

demonstrated the heights to which creative attainment could climb in
the encouraging climate.

Creativity thus became the summit of human

experience and supremely creative individuals the idols of the age.
The eighteenth century for Europe was a century of profound
awakening to new visions of the powers of reason and artistic expression, as is suggested by its designation as "the Age of Enlightenment."

France, the leading country of Europe's Enlightenment, was

deeply embued with Cartesian rationalism from the 1600s and the
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attendant great drama, poetry, and critical writings of French
Classicism from that century.

Led by Boileau, Classicist criticism,

with its reliance on logical method, rule, deduction and basic
principles, dominated the critical works of both France and England
during most of the years of the Enlightenment.
The fundamental principle ruling the arts for sixteenth century
Classicists was "imitation," and results of imitative arts during the
Enlightenment were satisfying enough to obscure, to an extent, the
contradiction between "pure imitation," as the perfect method of bril1iant artistic accomplishment, and the exceptional effective results
possible through often thoroughly "inexplicable" means or methods--the
ever-present non-rational element in creative fine arts.

Boileau led

the later Classicists to recognize this element when he asserted,
quite like Plato, that the poet not under divine influences at birth
could never produce works of the highest order.

The clarity of French

Enlightenment ratonalism brought the phrase "je ne sais quoi" ("I
don't know what

11
)

into service as the suggestive, if not wholly

revelatory, description both of the quality of the brilliant work and
also of the element of greatness in the "born" genius.
Following Boileau, the French rationalist critics, Bouhours and
Dubas, penetrated further into the experience of artists• nonrational processes and introduced the concepts of delicatesse" (sen11

sitivity) and

11

indistinctness

11

as key elements in the artists• crea-

tive processes and in the appreciators• experiences.

Alongside reason

and rule, ''feeling" and "being moved" were acknowledged as motive
forces in creativity and aesthetic experience.
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The surest voice in English Enlightenment aesthetics was that of
the Neoplatonist, Shaftesbury, who raised creative genius even above
the previous heights of divine, inborn gifts of artistic creativity.
Shaftesbury saw in artistic creation a replication of nature's own essential foment of productive changes and recognized artistic creativeness underlying intuitional understanding as the only technique for
truly comprehending nature in its essence.
the quality of genius.

This, for Shaftesbury, was

The basis of "knowledge" here shifted from

logic and the deductive rules of reason to the suprarational faculty,
intuition.

Shaftesbury further articulated the formative role of

imagination in creative enterprise, bringing "inspiration" into nearly
conscious, voluntary control by the creative individual.
The Enlightenment's high conception of the inexplicable, nonrational quality of superlative creative productions was summed up by
Immanuel Kant's final suggestion that the genius "does not himself
know how the

1

ideas

1

for (his creation) have entered his head ••• ,"243

and that it is in the nature and power of this non-rational element of
genius to give "the rule to art."244 Further, Kant gave one of the
first psychological descriptions of the difference between creative
genius and scientific giftedness asserting that the latter deserved
the highest distinction because its work was rational and capable of
being communicated to others (i.e. was "knowledge") while artistic
creative processes and products could not be fully explicated or communicated (i.e. were not "known" or understood).
Although beginning on a strongly rationalistic footing, the Age
of Enlightenment brought into play observational approaches to crea-
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tivity which revealed important psychological elements, such as imagination's role in inspiration and emotion's role in providing internal
motivation and directon.

Genius continued to be conceived as inborn,

but its attributes were more clearly distinguished than previously,
including acknowledgement of the inexplicable arrival of ideas and
their frequently experienced quality of being laws unto themselves.
Further, while genius continued to be directly identified with
artistic creativity, scientific giftedness was distinguished as
rational and communicable, and this distinction implied an unanalyzed
dissimilarity of productive process.

The laurel for heights of human

achievement was divided in this Age:

early, the Neoplatonist

Shaftesbury followed the Renaissance's lead and enthroned creative
genius as the epitome of human experience; later, the idealist Kant
enthroned scientific endeavor as the zenith of human enterprise.
The times proceeded with increasing dedication of energies along
the lines of scientific advancement and high valuation of intellectual
rationality over all, ultimately to usher in the first half of the
twentieth century, deeply embued with observational predisposition,
objectivity orientation and research mindedness.

The twentieth cen-

tury was also given a special forward thrust for creativity theory by
the work of Galton in the mid-nineteenth century with its broad-based
correlational studies and its close association of genius with both
creativity and intellectual giftedness.

The two directions proved

significant for the new century's concepts of creativity and genius.
Early in the twentieth century, statistical and experimental
methodologies combined to produce intelligence tests.

Due to the
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implied association of intellectual endownment (giftedness) and creativity (genius), exceptionally intellectually gifted students, as
identified by intelligence (IQ) tests, were promptly labelled
"geniuses," as in the early works of Terman and his associates.

In

time, however, "genius" lost nearly all articulated or assumed reference to creativity, as intelligence tests were the identifiers of high
IQ and genius, but those who scored high in IQ often proved to be
neither obviously innovative nor outstandingly creative.
As the century got underway, the early experimental work on
intelligence tests, as well as Terman s massive study of young
1

geniuses, involved observation of various traits of personality,
behavior, background, etc., which data formed the basis for the
specialized study of personalities of the exceptionally endowed.
These studies multiplied in the second half of the twentieth century.
In the midst of the surging interest in exceptional intelligence
and genius early in the twentieth century, attention was drawn to the
"mysterious" process by which scientists and artists came to their
breakthroughs by the works of Poincare and Wallas, both of whom suggested a similar four-stage process to be operative.

The four-stage

processes included two reassuringly rational, explainable, stages
(1-preparation and 4-verification) and two more mysterious, nonrational stages {2-incubation and 3-illumination).

The stages of

creative work were soon recognized as generally the same in all creative fields from science and mathematics to art and literature.
Through these early systematic treatments, the entire creative process
was somewhat demystified.
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Creativity theory in the second half of the twentieth century
was given an unprecedented upsurge in attention as a result of the
1950 Presidential Address to the American Psychological Association by
J.P. Guilford when he assailed his fellow-psychologists with his
vision of the

11

appalling neglect of the subject of creativity in the

field of psychology.

11

Studies sprang up on all sides, with particular

concentrations in the areas of personality traits of creative individuals, creativity tests and the creative process.

No little extra

impetus was given to the interest in creativity when Sputnik was
launched in 1957, alerting the entire American nation to the need for
"more creativity," particularly in the sciences and in technological
fields.
In-depth studies of the creative personality began to identify
the anomalous personality and behavior patterns of creative individuals and to promote the first serious and broad-spectrum studies of
these divergencies, their effects, and (surprisingly) their possible
necessity.

The special difficulties these personality proclivities

(including non-conformity) created for the creative individuals from
childhood in school settings among peers with more normal traits and
behavior patterns became a serious focus of attention among researchers, as did the possible personal, societal and national costs associated with the thwarting of creativity.
Further, however out of tune
11

11

the divergent behaviors and pro-

cesses of creative individuals were with general group processes, and
however difficult creative persons were, as a consequence, to handle
in group situations such as the regular American classroom, it
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became apparent that the singular patterns of creative persons were
partially responsible for the achievement of innovation and the
successful production of the new creative work.

As a result,

psychologists and educators began to conceive education's roles with
respect to creative students as more supportive, facilitative and
constructively guidance-oriented than previous conceptions had
envisioned.
A significant portion of Guilford's landmark Address dealt with
the inadequacy of the widely-used intelligence tests to measure specific or general qualities of creativity.

His analysis included sugges-

tions for tasks which might be employed to measure the capacities or
aptitudes related to creativity according to his detailed Structure of
Intellect model. Within a decade, Torrance and his colleagues at the
University of Minnesota had produced their battery of tests known as
the Minnesota Test for Creativity based centrally on the capacity of
divergent-thinking as defined by Guilford.

The Minnesota Test was

soon broadened and reproduced as the Torrance Tests of Creative
Thinking.

Other creativity tests were developed during these years,

including tests similar to Torrance's (The Wallace and Kogan Battery,
the Getzels and Jackson Battery, and the Guilford divergent-thinking
tests) and other types of tests (the Barron-Welsh Art Scale, Stein's
Physiognomic Cue Test, and Mednick's Remote Association Test).

Most

of the creativity measures developed after the mid-century have been
widely tested and generally fall somewhat short of strong reliability
and predictive and discriminant validity.

The Torrance, Wallach and

Kogan, and Getzels and Jackson Batteries are the creativity tests most
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widely used and appear to provide only suggestive indications of creative capacity.
The creative process received in-depth attention after the midcentury, primarily through adaptations of Wallas• earlier four-stage
model (preparation, incubation, illumination and verification) originally validated by Patrick.

Guilford s similar four-stage model
1

provided a more mechanistic interpretation of the stages identified by
Guilford as input, cognition, production and evaluation; in Guilford's
model, however, the storage of information and retrieval loops were
given the clearly active description required to account for both
problem-solving and creating.

Torrance developed yet another varia-

tion, adding the significant fifth stage of 11 communication 11 to the
general model.
The Wallas/Patrick model, with its two non-rational stages
(2-incubation and 3-illumination) appears to articulate the experiential qualities of the basic stages of creativity more aptly than
Guilford's or Torrance's more mechanistic paradigms.

The appropriate-

ness of the inclusion of the non-rational experiences in the Wallas/
Patrick process model is validated by the sensitive suggestions given
in Poincare's description of his processes, which are not unlike those
of many other eminently creative individuals.

Further validation is

added by the most recent psychological analysis of the subtlest
aspects of creativity (the arrival, through vague processes of
incubation, at illumination) by Arieti.
The wide range of extensive analytical and theoretical work in
recent years by educators and psychologists has further identified

86

significant aspects of the creative personality and the creative process which shed increased light on creativity as a whole.

The special

absorption and drivenness of the creative personality at work,
characterized by ego-less dedication toward intrisically interesting
and important goals, provides a focus of attention for educators and
psycholgists alike with significant ramifications for such considerations as the utility of group-thinking and brain-storming processes in
promoting creativity and the need to allow students freedom to explore
personal interests in the classroom setting and beyond.
Two additionally important considerations emerge from modern
research which psychologists and educators must ponder concerning the
identification of and education for creativity.

First, early signs of

even the greatest ultimate innovativeness, such as Charles Darwin's,
are mysteriously absent, even to retrospective vision.

Second, ac-

cording to modern informed thought, the trait or combination of traits
of creativity are normally distributed across the entire population,
and therefore it has been asserted that "the abilities involved in
being creative are universal."245
Finally, in the recent few decades, "genius

11

has arrived at a

rather restrictively delimited definition due to the prevalence and
predictive power of intelligence tests as used in the psychological
and educational settings.

Genius is identified as an IQ of 150 or

above on the Stanford-Binet scale or its equivalent on other tests
scales.

Creativity, which until recently was a significant, if not

the only, factor in establishing an individual as a "genius," has all
but dropped entirely out of view as related to genius, due especially
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to the fact that IQ test scores over 120 have repeatedly been demonstrated to be independent of creativity as measured (however uncertainly) by creativity tests and, of the most creative students in
school, 70 percent have IQ's below 120.

As IQ tests began to dominate

the modern educational setting, their initial correction of undue
emphasis on spectacular individual performance may have ultimately
resulted in a new emphasis on Quiz Kid geniuses, with a resulting
disregard of and under-service thereby to 70 percent of the most
creative students in the schools.
Conclusions and Implications
From the study that has been completed, several conclusions can
be drawn with implications for future research and educational applications.
Over the centuries, creativity and intelligence have been
variously separated and combined, resulting in a continuing confusion
between the two and inconsistency in their treatment.

The use of the

term "genius" demonstrates the issue. While previously the term had
been reserved nearly exclusively to denote eminent creativity, at
present "genius" is used in the fields of psychology and education as
the generic descriptor for exceptionally high intelligence or IQ.

At

the same time, the suggested separation of creativity from intel1 igence

in this revised use of "genius'' is gainsaid by the explicit

association of the two in the current conventional usage of the term
to mean "excepti anal intellectual and creative power. 246
11

Further, with intelligence tests holding unprecedented authority
in assessment in the educational environment, achievement across the
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full range of subjects is construed to be directly related to intelligence; where IQ and achievement levels are at variance, the relative
terms of "under-" and "over-achiever" have been used to "explain" the
discrepancies.

The possible contribution or effect of creativity in

either case has been generally ignored.

Ultimately, creativity has

been implicitly subsumed under the dominant category of intelligence
with even creative excellence itself being casually assumed to reflect
high IQ or over-achievement.
In view of the confusions resulting from the nonsystematic
separation and combination of creativity and intelligence, and the
commonly implicit disregard of creativity altogether, it appears at
this point to be vital to distinguish creativity definitively from
intelligence.

As intelligence is highly rewarded in the culture at

this time, and creativity appears to be both exceptionally important
and implicitly thwarted, the distinguishing features of each need to
be brought to clear demonstration so that the promotion of each can be
addressed incisively.

The first step in distinguishing creativity

from intelligence must be the development of a definitive concept of
creativity based on its unique features and attributes.
Research trends to date suggest a broad and inclusive conceptua1 ization of creativity as a multifaceted capacity involving the intelligence factors of divergent-thinking and crystallized and fluid
intelligence, along with a wide range of personality factors.

This

concept of multifacetedness may ultimately be refined to a fruitful
and definitive characterization of creativity, in general; however,
viewed within these intellectual and psychological parameters, the
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specific and unique factors of creativity may actually be obscured.
For example, crystallized intelligence factors appears to be fundamental to both intelligence and creativity, and fluidity is, in and of
itself, often a subjective judgement and the factor may be
characteristic of many mental operations in addition to those involved
in creativity.
promising for

As a result, these factors would appear to be more
11

describing 11 creativity than for

11

discriminating" crea-

tivity from intelligence or other mental capacities.

Similarly, psy-

chological traits such as non-conformity and driven-ness of personality are characteristic of many persons other than the highly creative,
so their use in developing a distinct profile for identification of
creative personalities may be ultimately limited.
The heart of the issue of developing a discriminative definition
of creativity seems to be in selecting the most promising point of
departure and it would appear that focusing on the unique aspects of
the "creative process 11 itself should reveal the most definitive
features of creativity.

The most useful model of the creative process

to date appears to be the Wallas/Patrick four-stage model.

Central in

the process is the stage of illumination in which the unique
experience of the creative "breakthrough," the "decidedly new and
effective vision," is experienced.

Although certainly there must be

unique attributes to the creative sub-processes involved in the stages
of preparation and verification which must be researched, the unique
mental operations and experiences involved in creative incubation and
illumination seem to be the sites at which the most unique features of
creativity must be isolated, defined, and ultimately distinguished
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from other mental operations which it shares in common with general
intelligence.

Arieti's proposals of endoceptual processes with their

suggested natural organizational structure and subtle connections appear to be promising preliminary steps.
out and more completely ramified.

The work needs to be filled

Additionally, recent neurophysio-

logical findings must be reviewed and brought into relation with the
psychological and mental processes involved in creativity where
relevant and if possible.
Once a finely discriminative definition of creativity has been
achieved, a battery of tests must be developed and refined to assess
creative capacity as distinct both from other mental capacities and
from other patterns of psychological styles, as well.

For example, it

seems clear that while the capacities of gaining fluid and in-depth
access to rich reservoirs of retrievable experience and of sustaining
intense involvement, persistent self-application, independence of
mind, and so forth are necessary intellectual and psychological attributes of the creative individual, they seem to function as the background or intellectual/psychological topography necessary for the
manifestation of creativity rather than as creativity itself.

A

definitive test of creative capacity would have to assess precisely
those traits which function in bringing about the conscious cognition
of previously unknown or unrecognized links between the current unsatisfied or problematic situation and the new apt and satisfying
resolution.
Until such a definitive and discriminative test has been
devised, it would seem that the current multifaceted conception of
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creativity provides the best clues to the general characteristics of
the capacity.

Creativity, conceived in this way, would seem to be

accessible to measurement by a combination of currently available
creativity and intelligence tests together with personality
measurements for the purpose of initial identification, albeit a
tentative one, of potentially creative individuals.

At the present,

creativity tests are generally quite unpredictive and therefore are,
by themselves, insufficient measures of real creative capacity;
however, they may be more suggestive of creativity-specific capacities
than either intelligence tests or psychological measurements alone
and, as such, would be a key component in a combination-test program
for creativity where such testing appears to be necessary.
Finally, serious consideration needs to be given to the recent
suggestions of psychologists and educational researchers that
creativity may well be a trait normally distributed in varying degrees
across the entire population and that early signs of great creative
powers may continue to be indiscernable.

If stultified creativity

entails the personal, social and national costs that have been
hypothesized, the most important concern for educators of the present
may be how to facilitate the growth and development of creativity of
all students throughout their entire educational careers.
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